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DON'T BELIEVE EVERYTHING
YOU THINK:* COGNITIVE BIAS IN
LEGAL DECISION MAKING
IAN WEINSTEIN**
This article discusses the role of cognitive bias in legal decision
making. Drawing on research in cognitive science and law, it ex-
plores the impact of cognitive bias on both lawyers and clients. These
often subtle mental biases can lead to pervasive errors in decision
making by causing us to ignore important information and make in-
accurate predictions. They may lead a client to underestimate the risk
of litigation. They may also lead a lawyer to miscategorize a client's
value choice as a misjudgement of fact. The article offers illustrative
stories of the impact of bias on both client and lawyer and suggests
how to identify and attenuate these biases. It closes with the reminder
that careful study and reflection will make us better legal counselors,
but a precise analysis of lawyerly judgement still eludes us.
I. INTRODUCTION
"They took a bag from me, but this paper says it was a box," Mr.
Worth repeated. "They have no case against me. No jury will send
me away when the prosecutor is lying and saying the drugs were in a
paper bag. A paper bag is not a box."
"I will argue that," I assured him again, "But what do you think
the prosecutor will say about the bag or box business? Like I said
before, I think the agent will just say it was a mistake on the com-
plaint. The prosecutor will say that the drugs inside are what matters.
I don't think the jury will focus the whole case on that."
"But it was a bag." He insisted.
"I hear you." I replied, nodding.
James Worth1 and I sat in an attorney client conference room on
the third floor of the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York
* Bumper Sticker on a Volvo 240 wagon.
** Associate Professor of Law and Director, Brendan Moore Advocacy Center, Ford-
ham University School of Law. Thanks to Mark Aaronson, James Cohen, Deborah Denno,
Martha Rayner and Monica Rickenberg, the participants in the Fordham Law School
Works in Progress Colloquium and my research assistants, Hannah Shay and Sara Feld-
schreiber. Fordham University provided financial support for this project.
I James Worth and the Worth case are composites based upon hundreds of clients with
whom I have worked in the United States Courts for the Southern and Eastern District of
New York. I was an Associate Attorney with the Federal Defender Services Division of
the Legal Aid Society of New York from 1988-1991 and now represent defendants as a
member of the Criminal Justice Act Panel for the Southern District of New York (SDNY).
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City. He had been arrested on a complaint charging him with conspir-
acy to distribute cocaine. I had been appointed to represent him. This
was our third meeting and it seemed to be going reasonably well. Mr.
Worth asked relevant questions and was engaged in the discussion.
He and I had not yet resolved our differences on the key question of
whether or not a jury would convict him, but coming to a shared pre-
diction about the outcome of a serious criminal case is a complex pro-
cess for both lawyer and client. It should not be rushed.
I learned that lesson after representing hundreds of clients
charged with federal felonies. As I reflected on my conversations with
clients, I was often struck by how readily they mixed solid common
sense and utterly illogical argument. I questioned my clients' wisdom
and sometimes noted that people who commit crimes are not distin-
guished by their good judgment. I was, in an important way, quite
wrong. Whatever the quality of their judgment, my clients exhibit the
same pervasive errors in decision making, commonly called cognitive
biases, as the rest of us.2 They are acting on the same cognitive biases
that cause most of us to report that we are above average drivers, fail
to wash our hands before dinner but refuse to go outside because of
ticks and hold on to a losing investment far too long. Although there
may be reason to think that defendants in criminal cases may be more
prone to these errors,3 these are differences in degree, not in kind.
Both clients, and their lawyers, are subject to cognitive bias. This is an
essay about how lawyers and clients can recognize and respond to cog-
nitive illusions. The story of my defense of a federal narcotics case
illustrates these problems, but this is just one example of a common
set of lawyering problems. 4
2 Cognitive biases, also known as cognitive illusions, are systematic errors in judgment
and prediction. They cause us to overpredict the frequency of rare but vivid events like
airplane accidents while we underestimate the frequency of car accidents, which are much
more common. These systematic biases have been of interest to cognitive scientists and
experimental economists for some time. The classic works, which brought these ideas to
wide attention are Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, PAUL SLOVIC &
AMos TVERSKY ED. JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982).
3 For discussion of the role of individual difference on cognitive bias, see infra note 92
and accompanying text. Stress and distress may also increase cognitive error. See infra
note 90 and accompanying text.
4 General analysis of lawyering is difficult. Varying norms govern the many different
contexts in which lawyers use their specialized knowledge. Although clinical writers ask
broad questions about lawyering, the range of variations in skills and substantive law
across practice areas means that the answers to questions about lawyering are often incon-
sistent at all but the highest levels of generality. Should lawyers advance only their clients'
aims or also account for the needs of third parties or the legal system? Should lawyers
offer unsolicited advice or refuse to offer advice when asked? General answers are often
unsatisfactorily vague, but contextualized discussion can be quite rich. This essay is a con-
textualized approach.
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Lawyers should account for cognitive bias in their clients and
themselves for two reasons. First, recognizing and responding to cog-
nitive bias or illusion can improve the quality of client decision mak-
ing.5 Cognitive biases can lead to bad choices. A client may decide on
a particular resolution of a case based on a faulty prediction about the
likely outcome of a given course of action6 or an incorrect assessment
about relative desirability of different outcomes.7 The lawyer may not
effectively counsel8 the client 9 because he or she may fall prey to the
Three legal ethics scholars offer examples of interesting and valuable context specific
analysis. Paul R. Tremblay, The New Casuistry, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 489 (1999) (ar-
guing that casuistry, which relies on paradigm moral exemplars, offers a good model for
reasoning about legal ethics); Bruce A. Green, Symposium Case Studies in Legal Ethics:
There but for Fortune: Real-life Vs. Fictional "Case Studies" in Legal Ethics, 69 FORDHAM
L. REV. 977 (2000) (concluding that "fleshed out" stories of real ethical problems are the
best learning tools but hard to find); Robert Rubinson, Attorney Fact-finding, Ethical Deci-
sion-making and The Methodology of Law, 45 ST. Louis L.J. 1185 (2001) (arguing that
ethics discourse should account for the interpretative complexity of fact finding, promote
understanding the circumstances of clients and cases and promote a textured approach).
The report of a conference at Fordham Law School on ethical issues in the legal repre-
sentation of children is another example of context specific analysis of lawyering problems.
The introduction discusses some of the particular problems posed by representing children.
Bruce A. Green & Bernadine Dohrn, Foreword: Children and the Ethical Practice of Law,
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1286-90 (1996) (discussing a range of problems lawyers typically
encounter when they represent children and introducing more than a score of reports,
articles and responses analyzing and suggesting approaches to remedy those problems).
5 See John M.A. DePippa, How Prospect Theory Can Improve Legal Counseling, 24
U. ARK. LIrrLE ROCK L. REV. 81 (2001) (applying prospect theory to legal counseling and
analyzing how its insights can help lawyers counsel their clients to make better decisions).
6 See infra note 112 and accompanying text for a discussion of how cognitive bias can
lead to bad predictions about the outcome of a trial or the judge's ruling on a legal issue.
7 In choosing between two options, bias can make us more sensitive to the appearance
of gain or loss than the actual difference in value between those two choices. For example,
many poker players are happy if they make up earlier losses and end the game with the
same amount as they started. Many are happier in that case than if they win early, lose
much of it later and walk away with only a small portion of their earlier large winnings.
The second player walks away with a profit, but feels the loss of the large stack of chips
while the first player has only broken even but likely feels better about the game when it
ends on a positive trend. See infra note 38, 39 for a more detailed discussion of anchoring
and framing biases.
8 Legal counseling is the process by which lawyers and their clients exchange informa-
tion and reach decisions about a legal matter. Books widely used to teach legal counseling
address the development of legal theories, interviewing and counseling techniques and the
allocation of authority between lawyer and client. The first widely used text, DAVID
BINDER & SUSAN PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED
APPROACH (1977), popularized the idea of client centered lawyering. That book, and its
successor, DAVID BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN, & SUSAN PRICE, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS:
A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1991), discourage lawyers from offering their own views
or giving unsolicited advice. Other texts address the same mix of issues but are less em-
phatic in their focus on client autonomy. See generally, STEFAN KRIEGER, RICHARD NEU-
MANN, JR., KATHLEEN MCMANUS & STEVEN JAMAR, ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS
(1999); ROBERT BASTRESS & JOSEPH HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING AND NE-
GOTIATION (1990).
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same cognitive bias or spot the problem but lack the tools to help the
client overcome it. In any case, the result will be a bad decision about
an important matter.
The second benefit to understanding cognitive illusion is improv-
ing the attorney client relationship. Clients often begin their own
analysis with faulty reasoning but come to see their situation more
clearly over time. Too many lawyer client relationships start badly, as
conflict quickly develops around the differing initial views of the case.
Understanding why this happens can encourage lawyers to give their
clients time and guidance to acquire better information and process it
more reliably. Lawyers and client can avoid conflict if they share a
more accurate picture of the situation before them.
Although technical insight into cognition can improve lawyering,
legal decision making cannot, and should not, be reduced to a mathe-
matical calculus. The client's (and the lawyer's) emotional responses
and the interpersonal dynamics between lawyer and client are almost
always important and may often be determinative of the decisions
clients make. More importantly, the significant decisions about which
we counsel clients almost always come down to value choices;
9 Legal counseling is multi-dimensional. Effective counseling requires command over
doctrine, good communication skills, strategic vision and psychological insight into others
and oneself. Recognizing and responding to cognitive illusions is just one of many
problems that can arise during counseling. A skillful counselor must also be sensitive to
the interpersonal impact of cultural, class and status differences, and learn to identify and
respond to a range of psychological factors. For an introduction to the impact of cultural
differences on counseling, see generally, Paul Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling
Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, unpublished manuscript presented at the Interna-
tional Clinical Conference on file with author, note 7 & 8 (citing works on cross cultural
mental health including ALLEN E. IVEY & MARY BRADFORD IVEY, INTENTIONAL INTER-
VIEWING AND COUNSELING: FACILITATING DEVELOPMENT IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCI-
ETY, (4th ed. 1999); DAVID SUE & DEARLD WING SUE, COUNSELING THE CULTURALLY
DIFFERENT (3d ed. 1999); Earleen Baggett, Cross-Cultural Legal Counseling, 18 CREIGH-
TON L. REV. 1475 (1985); Susan Bryant, Five Habits of Cross-Cultural Lawyering, 8 CLIN.
L. REV. 31 (2001)). For a discussion of the impact of race and status difference, see gener-
ally, Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on
the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990); Michelle Jacobs, People From the
Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN STATE U. L.
REV. 345 (1997). For motivational or other non-pathological psychological factors, see
generally, Peter Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity: Regulating the Role of Law-
yers for Clients Accused of Terrorist Activities, unpublished manuscript on file with author
(discussing the importance of emotional connection in legal counseling); mental illness, see
e.g. James Cohen, The Attorney-Client Privilege, Ethical Rules, and the Impaired Criminal
Defendant, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 529 (1998) (arguing that lawyers should be permitted to
reveal confidences of mentally ill clients when the illness is known only to the lawyer and
compromises the ability to make rational choices). Cognitive limitations, other health is-
sues and language barriers are only a subset of the additional challenges we may face. Of
course there is also a group of client counseling situations, probably quite large, in which
none of these problems arise. Sometimes lawyers and clients understand each other and
the legal matter at hand.
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whatever the likely results of the various choices may be, our clients
will choose what they think best for themselves.
Distinguishing value choices from cognitive biases or illusions in
assessing a client's (or lawyer's) analysis of future results can be diffi-
cult. But making the distinctions and unpacking the cognitive bias is
worth doing. Our clients should have the best predictions about the
future and the best assessments of the relative merits of their choices
before them when they apply their own personal preferences to make
their decisions. Understanding bias will not yield perfect decisions but
it can improve the process of decision making. If we understand the
counseling process as, in part, guiding our client's information
processing along a well trod, but sometimes problematic path toward
predictions and assessments of relative merit, we may be more patient
and effective counselors than if we regard the client as singularly fool-
ish or lacking in judgment. 10
II. COGNITIVE BIAS AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE
Research into cognitive bias is part of the contemporary turn to-
ward cognitive science in psychology, philosophy and neuroscience.
The movement gained momentum after World War II, and has roots
in early twentieth century logicians and mathematicians." Spurred by
the development of computers and computer software after the war,
cognitive science's central feature is its focus on the mechanics of
thought and consciousness.12 Cognitive science has reimagined the
10 Legal theorists have paid significant attention to understanding seemingly irrational
behavior in scholarship known as Behavioral Decision Theory or Behavioral Law and Eco-
nomics. This work developed within, and in response to, the law and economics move-
ment. It has been applied to negotiation theory and dispute resolution. For a useful
overview of the legal literature see Donald C. Langevoort, Symposium; the Legal Implica-
tions of Psychology: Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics, and the Law: Behavioral
Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: a Literature Review, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); Jeffrey Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply
to Critics, Skeptics and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000). A recent and
interesting collection of essays in this area is, Cass R. Sunstein, ed., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS (2000).
11 For an introduction to cognitive science, see, HOWARD GARNER, THE MIND'S NEW
SCIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE COGNITIVE REVOLuTiON (1985). For an engaging, if some-
times tendentious treatment of some cognitive and evolutionary psychology themes see,
STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS (1997); STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE IN-
STINCT (1994).
12 Cognitive science revived the study of mental representations, which fell out of fash-
ion with the rise of Behaviorism. See, GARDNER, n.11, at 38-9, 383-4, discussing the central
role of the revival of the study of mental representations. They are variously described as
symbols, schemas, images, ideas, scripts, heuristics, categories, paradigms and rules.
Whatever the nomenclature, their advocates claim that they cannot be reduced to nerve
cells or other physical structures or safely ignored by focusing only on behavior.
The existence of mental representations were famously denied by the behaviorists.
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mind as an information processing machine, shaped by evolution to
respond to challenges in the world. 13 Though there is a diversity of
views on how well the information processor image captures the
mechanics of consciousness,' 4 the image of mind as computer 15 reso-
nates throughout cognitive science. 16
Some contemporary critics continue to argue that mental representations do not add a
useful layer of analysis, see infra note 16, although more of the contemporary action is in
the vigorous debate over the proper characterization and level of analysis of mental
representations.
13 Cognitive science returns us to the central Freudian question, how can we under-
stand the role of the irrational in human psychology. Freud suggested that conflicts among
our unconscious thoughts caused us to think and act irrationally. The behaviorists replaced
that model with a simpler story in which all action was analyzed as response to environ-
mental stimuli and apparent irrationality was just improperly analyzed stimulus and re-
sponse. Cognitive science returns to the idea of mental entities of which we are unaware,
but instead of unconscious emotions and desires, it posits an unseen information process-
ing machine. It whirs away in the background, producing our conscious experience while
we remain unaware of the process of production. Irrationality, cognitive science tells us, is
the product of the constraints and imperfections in our information processing. This para-
digm, like Freudian thought, posits a mental world which is not easy to see but may be
glimpsed through a veil. Also similar is the devotee's belief that this somewhat mysterious
realm offers insights into human irrationality.
14 A strong form of the mind as computer metaphor can be found in ALLAN NEWELL &
HERBERT SIMON, HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING (1972), which gave contemporary problem
solving study its theoretical underpinnings. They achieved some empirical success by view-
ing the mind as an information processing machine which takes in sensory input, processes
it according to rules and creates our conscious experience of ideas and feelings. The opera-
tion of our processor is not revealed to us in our ordinary conscious experience, but can be
studied empirically.
15 Viewing the mind as a computer leads to questions about how this particular ma-
chine works. Human memory has received attention. It is generally thought that the ca-
pacity of short term, or working, memory is quite limited. The classic article is, G. A.
Miller, The Magical Number Seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our Capacity for
Processing Information, 63 PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW 81 (1956), which gave rise to the
common observation that short term memory can hold seven items, although the uncer-
tainty expressed in the title remains the subject of important research and debate, see,
Nelson Cowan, The Magical Number 4 in Short-term Memory: A Reconsideration of Mental
Storage Capacity, 24 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 87 (2001) (reporting results sup-
porting a four item limit, with peer commentary). Whatever the actual limit, cognitive
science has explores how this limit effects human cognition.
Another basic feature of our cognitive apparatus is that we can focus on only one
thought at a time. This is known as serial conscious processing. Because we can only think
about one thing at a time, how we choose that thought and how we move from thought to
thought is of central interest to cognitive scientists. See generally, Herbert A. Simon, Ma-
chine as Mind, in MACHINES AND THOUGHT THE LEGACY OF ALAN TURING, Volume I, 87
(PJR Millican & A. Clark eds., 1996) (identifying serial conscious processing as a funda-
mental cognitive structure and constraint).
16 Of course not all who study thinking and reasoning are cognitive scientists or accept
the mind as computer metaphor. For a critique of the computational metaphor from ana-
lytic philosophy, see, L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE DIALOGUE OF REASON, 193-231(1986)
(arguing that the computational metaphor may be a useful psychological device but the
mind cannot be reduced to a computational entity and analytic philosophy, the normative
reasoning about the normative study of reasoning, is foundational and does not require or
[Vol. 9:783
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Among those who did early work in this paradigm, however, the
sheer vastness of the information processing the mind performs be-
came a central problem.1 7 We must deal with huge amounts of infor-
mation to make seemingly simple choices. Evolution has developed a
host of shortcuts to enable us to deal with the volume of information
we use to make everyday decisions. 18 These mental shortcuts are
known as heuristics. 19 A heuristic is a problem solving strategy that
stand upon a psychological theory). An important voice accepting some elements of the
cognitive science computational metaphor but reserving meaning and intention as irreduci-
ble is JOHN SEARLE, MINDS, BRAINS AND SCIENCE (1984).
17 Some early and influential researchers used the insights of early cognitive science to
analyze human problem solving. They tried to discover a general method of problem solv-
ing that would find answers across a wide range of disciplines. Their early work was not
fruitful, as they could not find a single problem solving method that could efficiently pro-
cess large volumes of information from different fields of knowledge. They subsequently
discovered, however, that solving systems became more powerful as context specific solv-
ing methods were added, not as better general methods of analysis were found. The re-
search began to move away from the search for a single, abstract method that could solve
many different kinds of problems. Instead, researchers moved toward context and content
dependent methods of problem solving. In other words, they learned that different prob-
lem solving methods are required for different kinds of problems. See Edward
Feigenbaum, What Hath Simon Wrought?, in COMPLEX INFORMATION PROCESSING, THE
IMPACT OF HERBERT A. SIMON, 172 (David Klahr & Kenneth Kotovsky eds., 1989);
NEWELL & SIMON, supra note 14, at 789 (discussing the context and content dependence of
problem solving). This reorientation in problem solving research led to study of the consis-
tent performance differences in the respective problem solving processes of novices and
experts. Experts are able to solve problems in their area of expertise, or domain, much
faster, more accurately and with much less conscious cognitive effort than novices. See
Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Func-
tions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 328 n.32 (1995) (explaining and applying the
novice expert distinction to lawyering). Good problem solvers deal with the challenge of
information volume by thoroughly learning an area and organizing the information so that
they can rapidly apply their knowledge to the problem at hand. Problem solving requires
command over information and solving techniques appropriate to the context.
18 It is important to note that evolution achieves neither perfect, nor uniformly adap-
tive results. Some changes are neutral, some are adaptive, some are maladaptive but not
deadly, some are adaptive at one time and maladaptive at another and others are maladap-
tive at one time and become adaptive as other changes occur. For an engaging defense of
contemporary evolutionary theory from a psychologist's perspective, see PINKER, How
THE MIND WORKS 155-183. A more fully developed popular defense of the biological
theory of evolution is RICHARD DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER (1986).
19 Good heuristics are less resource intensive than completely reliable problem solving
strategies, but not grossly less accurate. Statistical sampling is an example of a heuristic.
Rather than ask the preference of every voter, we ask some and extrapolate the probable
outcome of an election. Sampling has a margin of error and can result in inaccurate pre-
dictions. Asking every voter is a theoretically error free method of predicting the outcome,
if they were all honest and consistent, but very resource intensive (and some will note that
the election of 2000 illustrates that a large enough system generates sufficient noise to
vitiate all but abstract claims to reliability).
Modern marketing plays heavily upon heuristics, as we make many purchasing deci-
sions based on simple recognition or impressions, rather than complete and rigorous analy-
sis. It may make sense to buy a heavily advertised brand of detergent on the theory that a
company that invests money in building a reputation will be more careful to preserve that
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often, but not invariably, gives a correct solution.20
When crossing a street, we might try to measure a car's speed and
its distance from our crossing point. Then we could work out the
math to determine if the situation is within the range of speeds at
which we can safely cross the street. That is not what we do. When
we cross a street, we look both ways. If we see a car, we make an
almost, but not quite, instantaneous judgment about whether to walk,
run or stay. Rather than knowing the speed and distance and calculat-
ing crossing time, we sense or feel that it is either safe to cross (per-
haps we should run) or not safe to cross. We also have a margin of
error figured in and we register surprise and discomfort if the car
comes closer than we expected. This street crossing judgment is a
heuristic. We use visual cues which permit us to make rapid judg-
ments of speed based on the perceived size of a moving object. 21 It
asset, but that is only a rule of thumb or guide. It does not make sense for most of us to do
the research to determine the very best way to spend modest amounts of money.
Newell and Simon illustrate heuristics with a discussion of safecracking, an example
that highlights how we can sometimes use information gleaned from the problem solving
process. We are sure to find the correct combination to a safe if we try every possible
combination of numbers. If the safe has 10 independent dials, the generate and test
method requires searching 1020 elements. That is 10 followed by 20 zeros, or a very large
number of possible solutions. Assume, however, that the lock makes a faint click every
time a tumbler falls into place (the movie version is the stethoscope to the dial of the safe).
Listening for the clicks would require an average of fifty tries per dial or a total of 500 trials
to open the safe. NEWELL AND SIMON, supra note 14, at 98. In this example, the heuristic
search method is unusually powerful. It is highly selective and generates all and only ad-
missible solutions. Few heuristics are that robust. It is important to understand heuristics
not as proofs or methods that only lead to right answers. They are strategies that narrow
choices, identify pieces of the solution path and provide other kinds of help in finding the
right solution. See also, Ian Weinstein, Lawyering in the State of Nature, 23 VERMONT L.
REV. 1, n. 52-55 (1998).
20 The idea that cognition is a scarce resource that must be conserved by stopping at
solutions that are good enough for a given purpose is a key element of the concept of
bounded rationality. The Nobel prize winning economist Herbert Simon first popularized
the idea that we should focus on the limits of cognition to understand how we actually
analyze the world, as opposed to how we might analyze the world if human cognition were
limitless and we enjoyed unbounded rationality. He coined the term "satisficing" to cap-
ture the idea of making an acceptable choice among alternatives in a manner that respects
the limitations of time and knowledge. GERD GIGERENZER, PETER M. TODD & THE ABC
RESEARCH GROUP, SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART, 12-14 (1999) (describing
Simon as the father of bounded rationality). For a useful scholarly introduction and review
of the literature on bounded rationality see, John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE, 671 (1996).
21 As anyone who has ever driven by an airport and observed jumbo jets seeming to
hang in mid air over the runway has experienced, our heuristic dependence on judging
distance as a function of size simply cannot accept that a jumbo jet is as large and fast as it
is. Rather than recognize that a huge object is flying through the air at high speed, we
reduce the speed to account for its size. The effect is the image of a jet hanging in mid air.
We are not well adapted to judge the speed of jumbo jets, but we are better adapted to
judge the speed of cars, which are not much bigger that many carnivorous predators and
don't move all that much faster.
[Vol. 9:783
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works quite well in most settings and once we have developed this
judgment, few people get hit by cars.
Street crossing judgment and calculation of the time at which the
car will enter our crossing zone each have their strengths. Calculation
involves higher deliberation costs but is more generalizable and can
be reliably replicated. Heuristics are efficient, ubiquitous and invisi-
ble. We are not conscious of our constant use of shortcuts to manage
information. It is just the way we think. Despite their similar func-
tions, heuristics and rigorous calculation 22 are not the same in at least
two important respects. The two always use distinct methods of analy-
sis. More importantly, the answer to the same question is sometimes
different, depending on which kind of analysis is used.23
If we can make decisions in different ways, perhaps we choose
the best method for the problem. After all, crossing a street is quite
different from making a decision as important as how to resolve a
serious criminal charge. One decision requires immediate action and
has no lasting consequences, unless the decision is an utter failure.
The other decision typically permits time for careful study and reflec-
tion, and is made in consultation with others. Thus, one might think
that people would use more rigorous analysis when they decide how
to resolve a criminal case than they would when they cross the street.
In fact, our conscious experience would lead many of us to the strong
conviction that we make important decisions in a wholly rational way,
22 The alternative to heuristics, which are solutions from bounded rationality, are "solu-
tions from unbounded rationality." See supra note 20.
23 Another critique of the cognitive bias literature grants that our minds use shortcuts
in reasoning, but argues that those shortcuts do not have any systematic bias. These critics
argue that bounded rationality, properly utilized and understood, yields the same answers
as unbounded rationality. They argue that while it is undeniable that people make deci-
sions that diverge from the choice of the hypothetical rational actor, the experimental data
supporting pervasive bias is explained as the result of random errors that cancel each out in
the aggregate, individual differences among subjects, experimental error and misanalysis of
the sample problems. See, e.g., L. J. COHEN, THE DIALOGUE OF REASON, 149-192 (1986).
For a very thoughtful and thorough discussion of the literature on this debate, see, Keith E.
Stanovich & Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the
Rationality Debate, 23 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES 645 (2000) (concluding that
while intelligence, problem definition and contextual factors all give rise to performance
errors, a significant gap remains between the normatively predicted rational result and the
actual descriptive result which can best be explained by a pervasive and systematic element
of irrationality or cognitive bias). Stanovich and West characterize the clashing camps as
the Meliorists, who see pervasive errors and wish to correct them, and the Panglossians,
who offer other explanations for apparent irrationality and defend the rationality hypothe-
sis. For a recent example of the Panglossian camp in the legal literature see, Gregory
Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New
Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 1907 (2002) (arguing that incor-
rect problem definition, experimental error, inappropriate generalization from group be-
havior to individual decision making and other flaws cause advocates of behavioral
economics to overstate its reach in the law).
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thinking everything through and taking no shortcuts.
Unfortunately, research does not support the view that people
are typically less subject to cognitive bias when they make important
decisions.24 We often spend more time considering important deci-
sions. But most of us do not collect complete data or engage in sys-
tematic analysis of the data we have. Nor do we typically use
generally accepted techniques to assess and review our conclusions.
When we choose a law school, buy a home or analyze a settlement
offer, we generally rely on our judgment. 25
Empirical work suggests that we can improve our judgment if we
are conscious of our cognitive biases and practice correcting them.26
The studies also show that it can be difficult for even trained, careful
professionals to identify and completely correct for the way our minds
work. 27 Let us return to Mr. James Worth and his lawyer and begin
24 Conlisk, supra note 20, at 671-72 (noting there is some evidence that repeat players
with significant stakes will accept high deliberation costs to attenuate some biases but that
other evidence suggests that high stakes alone do not tend to improve decision making);
Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics and Settlement: A New Look at
the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, note 71 (citing RICHARD H. THALER, THE
PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS CONFERENCE HANDBOOK: COMMENTS ON SIMON, ON EIN-
HORN AND HOGARTH, and TVERSKY AND KAHNEMAN, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CON-
TRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 95, 96 (1987) and two other studies as
supporting the view that higher stakes do not attenuate bias).
25 For a vigorous and thought provoking argument that ecologically tuned heuristics
can be more reliable than solutions from unbounded rationality, see, GERD GIGERENZER
& DANIEL G. GOLDSTEIN, BETTING ON ONE GOOD REASON: TAKE THE BEST HEURISTIC;
JEAN CZERLINSKI, GERD GIGERENZER & DANIEL G. GOIDSTEIN, How GOOD ARE SIM-
PLE HEURISTICS; LAURA MARTIGNON & ULRICH HOFFRAGE, WHY DOES ONE-REASON
DECISION MAKING WORK: A CASE STUDY IN ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY; JORG RIES-
KAMP & ULRICH HOFFRAGE, WHEN Do PEOPLE USE SIMPLE HEURISTICS, AND How CAN
WE TELL; Laura Martignon & Kathryn Blackmond Laskey, Beysian Benchmarks for Fast
and Frugal Heuristics, in GERD GIGERENZER, PETER M. TODD & THE ABC RESEARCH
GROUP, SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART, 75-190 (1999) (marshaling empirical
and theoretical support for the robustness and validity of simple heuristics as measured
against results from unbounded rationality). Gigerenzer argues that fast and frugal heuris-
tics are related to satisficing, but are a distinct branch of bounded rationality that relies
more upon environmental structure to resolve a broader range of problems. Id. at 15.
Although I find Gigerenzer's view compelling, not all experts in that field agree with his
ecological focus. For a discussion locating this view in the debate, see Stanovich & West,
supra note 23 at, 663.
26 A 1982 study summarizing the results of 40 studies on overcoming bias suggests that
some techniques can lessen the impact of some biases. Baruch Fischoff, Debiasing, in
KAHNEMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 422. A more recent work surveying nine different
debiasing studies, including Fischoff, concludes that although some techniques "do attenu-
ate biases, the attenuation is typically limited." Conlisk, supra note 20, at 671 (surveying
research on bounded rationality and heuristics and concluding that wide ranging evidence,
explanatory success, methodology and scarcity of cognitive resources support research on
bounded rationality).
27 David M. Eddy, Probabilistic Reasoning in Clinical Medicine: Problems and Oppor-
tunities, in KAHNEMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 249 (arguing that medical doctors misuse
probabilistic reasoning in clinical diagnosis in a manner consistent with cognitive biases);
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the work of discovering how each of them may display and correct
cognitive bias.
III. MR. JAMES WORTH: AN EXAMPLE OF THE PROBLEM OF
COGNITIVE BIAS IN LEGAL COUNSELING
James Worth is twenty six and in jail for the first time in his life.
Mr. Worth grew up in Baltimore and New York City. At the time of
his arrest he was working as a prep cook at a chain restaurant on 48th
Street. A soft spoken and articulate man, Mr. Worth liked to snort
cocaine occasionally, borrowed too much money from his family and
played the lottery three or four times a week. Until now, he had made
good enough choices, and had enough good fortune, to be a 26 year
old New Yorker with a job, a stable social network and no criminal
convictions. His situation had changed.
The criminal complaint 28 alleged that Mr. Worth and others had
conspired to sell five kilograms and more of cocaine.29 The govern-
ment asserted that a confidential informant had twice recorded Mr.
Worth negotiating to sell cocaine. On the day of his arrest, he was
observed talking to one of his co-defendants on a street in lower Man-
hattan. He and his co-defendant then went to the trunk of a parked
car. The co-defendant opened the trunk and Mr. Worth removed a
brown paper bag. He and his co-defendant were putting the bag in
the trunk of another car when they were arrested. The bag contained
five one kilogram bricks of cocaine, wrapped in paper and tape.
Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski & Andrew Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 COR-
NELL L. REV. 777, n. 26 (2001) (analyzing data showing the United States Magistrate
Judges display cognitive biases and collecting studies showing biases in auditors, psycholo-
gists, physicians, option traders, soldiers and real estate agents); ScoTr PLOUS, PSYCHOL-
OGY OF DECISION MAKING, 258 (1993) (collecting studies on the judgments of experts,
some of which show significant correction of biases, some of which show attenuation of
bias and others that report experts display the same biases as college students).
28 The complaint is the initial charging document in a federal criminal case. It contains
a sworn statement of the facts upon which the government relies to establish probable
cause to initiate the prosecution. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5; Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103
(1975) (requiring that a sworn statement establishing probable cause be promptly filed to
support any warrantless arrest or continued custody). An indictment will later replace the
information and become the formal statement of the allegations upon which pleading and
trial will proceed. Indictments have little narrative, generally reciting no more than the
statutory language with dates and places added, and offer much less information about the
government's probable factual theory than the information.
29 The quantity of the drugs charged in the indictment is phrased using a term of art
which triggers the mandatory minimum provision of 21 U.S.C. § 841(B)(1)(A) (2002).
Conviction for distributing five kilograms and more of cocaine carries a ten year
mandatory minimum. The actual sentence is subject to the sentencing guidelines and cer-
tain statutory exemptions from the mandatory minimum. See infra note 68 and accompa-
nying text.
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I was appointed 30 to represent Mr. Worth on the day he first ap-
peared in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York. I knew that he was in a very serious situation.31 In the
next days, weeks or months he would make decisions that would de-
termine whether he would spend the next two, eight or twelve years in
prison. These would be some of the most important decisions Mr.
Worth would ever make.32
Like all of us, he struggles to make sense out of a dangerous and
unfamiliar world. He uses the same talents, strengths and strategies
that have served him all his life. Here, however, he is making a deci-
sion for which we insist he have counsel. How well does he, and his
counselor, size up the situation?
A. The Meeting Before the Initial Appearance
I first met Mr. Worth in a cellblock interview room on the fourth
floor of the federal courthouse. We sat at matching metal counters on
opposite sides of a mesh grill. I was in a suit and laid my law books on
the counter. He was dressed in a. knit shirt and khakis. He sat down
and rested his handcuffed hands on his side of the counter.
"Hello Mr. Worth, my name is Ian Weinstein. I am a lawyer and
the court will appoint me to represent you unless you make other ar-
30 Pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act, 18 USC 3006A.
31 As in any serious criminal case, the defendant is brought unwillingly to the law and
his or her liberty is at stake. Federal narcotics sentences averaged 76.4 months in 1999. U.
S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1999 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS table 7
(2000). Almost one-third of the group in this average received a sentence reduction (me-
dian reduction of 48%) for assisting the government and another 15% received other kinds
of sentence reductions (median reduction 38.9%). Id. at tables 9, 30 & 31. The average
sentence for the portion of the defendants who went to trial or did not receive favorable
sentencing consideration, and appealed their cases and/or sentences was 180 months. Id. at
table 61. There is a great deal at stake and a range of sentencing outcomes from the terri-
ble to the truly horrific.
32 Lawyering in high stakes cases poses challenges. The stakes in any particular matter
must usually be evaluated relative to the client's situation. An eviction matter can be a life
or death case to a person in public housing who lives in New York City but may be little
more than an inconvenience to a person of means who can easily find other housing. Simi-
larly, a minor criminal matter can be devastating to a professional with licenses at stake,
but of less concern to some others. The relative value of punishment upon different of-
fenders has been the subject of much comment. See, e.g., John R. Lott, Jr., Should the
Wealthy be Able to "Buy Justice"?, 95 J. POL. ECON. 1307 (1987) (arguing that white collar
crimes are overpenalized because any penalty also carries a very high reputational cost);
Dan M. Kahan, Punishment Incommensurability, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 691 (1998) (arguing
that the public would be more accepting of alternative sentencing if it were recast to em-
phasize the blameworthiness of the offenders). Whatever the relative costs and merits of
other kinds of actions and sentences, criminal cases that involve prison sentences averaging
six years, with the potential for sentence over 15 years, are high stakes matters of singular
importance to the defendants charged. Perhaps this is because lengthy sentences of impris-
onment are all measured against an invariable metric - human lifespan.
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rangements for a lawyer," I said, by way of introduction.
"OK" he replied, "When am I getting out?" He sounded worried
and tired, but he did not seem agitated. That lessened my apprehen-
sion a notch.
I looked him in the eye and told him, "That is my main concern
right now and I want to talk to you about bail, but how are you?"
I was taught that the first interview in a serious criminal case has
three goals. The first is to begin to build rapport with a new client.
The second is to develop the strongest possible bail argument by
learning about the client's background and situation. The third goal is
to learn whether immediate factual development or investigation is
required. 33 I pursued those goals, trying to build rapport by beginning
with my client's immediate situation. I asked whether he had eaten,
how long had been in custody, had he slept and did he have any imme-
diate medical needs. 'Then I paraphrased the complaint, explained its
function and summarized the broad outlines of the possible and likely
penalties, 34 should he be convicted. I also gave him a summary expla-
nation of the initial phases of a criminal case and a longer description
of the process for determining whether he would be released or de-
tained pending trial.
Returning to information gathering, I moved back in time to his
arrest. I hoped to learn if he had made any statements to the authori-
ties and to get a sense of whether the circumstances of his arrest might
give rise to any legal issues. We spoke very little about the facts of the
case. Mr. Worth did tell me that there was box in the trunk of his car,
not a bag. He also said they did not have a case against him. I an-
swered that it was too early to evaluate the case and that we would
learn more soon.
I already knew that the government was going to request the
three day adjournment of the detention hearing to which it was statu-
torily entitled.35 As Mr. Worth would be held for three days no mat-
33 For a fuller explication of this view of the initial interview in a criminal case, which
puts most factual development off until a second interview, see HARRY SUBIN, CHESTER
MIRSKY & IAN WEINSTEIN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL PRACTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE,
§ 6.6 The Initial Defense Interview (1992).
34 At this stage, discussion of the potential penalties will be very general. I would ex-
plain the statutory maximum and any statutory minimum as part of reviewing the statute,
but offer only the most general characterizations, of the broad range of possible sentences.
I always tell clients that statutory maxima are so high in federal law that they really do not
offer any useful information about the probable sentence. I also note that almost all
sentences are far below the maximum. I have now learned, however, that the framing
literature suggests that these very high numbers might play more of a role in client thinking
than I had supposed. I have become more cautious about discussing penalties early in a
case as a result of this research.
35 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2002) (upon government request the hearing may be delayed for
up to three days, or longer upon a showing of good cause).
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ter what happened, there were no immediate decisions to be made. I
started to conclude the interview by turning to the financial affidavit
required to prove that he qualified for appointed counsel. I made sure
I knew who he wanted me to contact and how to reach them. Then I
told him I would see him in the courtroom and walked out of the
interview room. As I waited to be buzzed into the public corridor of
the courthouse I heard the clang of the metal door on Mr. Worth's
side of the interview room.
My inquiry into the facts underlying the charge was cursory36 and
I did not ask Mr. Worth if he had agreed with others to distribute
narcotics. I tried to give him the opportunity to raise those matters if
he chose and I listened carefully for details that might suggest the
need for immediate investigation. I made no predictions or promises
about how the case would come out and tried to express concern for
Mr. Worth but agnosticism about the merits of case. I was taught that
this sort of initial interview protects the nascent attorney client rela-
tionship. People in bad situations often want an immediate prediction
or evaluation, but great damage can be done when an initial assess-
ment, based on incomplete or inaccurate information, is inaccurate.
Cognitive bias research illuminates why early predictions, even if ex-
pressed in very tentative terms, can cast a cloud over the whole coun-
seling relationship.
1. Framing and Hindsight Biases
First impressions make a big cognitive difference. Lawyers must
exercise great care in offering early evaluation of their clients' legal
situations because that assessment will likely become the benchmark
against which subsequent events will be measured. Though Mr.
Worth has a general idea of the gravity of his situation, the first spe-
cific information about possible or likely outcomes will become the
baseline against which other developments will be measured. An
early suggestion that the prosecution has a weak case, even if couched
36 Although this is not an essay on initial interviews in criminal cases, I note that there
are good reasons to delay factual inquiry in this case. When a defendant is arrested for
conduct that spanned several months, there is little reason to think his or her recall for
those events will be better immediately after the arrest than it will be two or three days
later, after pretrial release and other preliminary issues have been resolved. An interview
conducted within a few days will almost always be more conducive to a productive discus-
sion. The lawyer can use the bail proceedings and other initial matters to build trust and
the client will often benefit from time to calm down after the shock of the arrest. The
lawyer must, however, look for matters that must be developed at the first interview. The
facts of the arrest are very fresh and will often be relevant to pretrial motions. Careful
interviewing may also reveal evidence that may need to be swiftly preserved or other mat-
ters that require immediate attention. In general however, only a very narrow group of
facts require immediate development.
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in tentative language, will make subsequent bad news seem even
worse.37 This is an example of the cognitive bias known as framing, or
anchoring, which is the tendency to give undue positive weight to im-
provement relative to a perceived baseline, while viewing loss relative
to that marker in an unduly negative light. In addition to taking on
disproportionate weight in decision making, those perceptions of gain
or loss will also tend to crowd out other, sometimes more important,
factors.
In its general form, framing bias is the tendency to view a given
problem in different terms depending on the perspective from which
the problem is viewed.38 More narrowly, it is the tendency for people
to avoid risk to protect what they perceive as a gain but seek risk to
avoid what they understand as a loss. 39 An experiment offers an ex-
ample of the impact of framing on legal decision making. Two groups
of subjects were presented with a proposed settlement of a hypotheti-
cal car accident case. Each group was told that they had lost $28,000,
and each was offered $21,000 in settlement.4 0 Both groups were told
they had the same chances if they continued to litigate the matter and
were given enough information to determine that the settlement offer
was higher than the expected value of litigation. 41 Although the eco-
nomics were the same for both, the group for whom the offer was
framed as a gain was more likely to settle than the group for whom it
appeared to be a loss.
One group, which I will call the gainers, was told they had in-
curred $14,000 in medical expenses, which had already been reim-
bursed by their health insurance company. The remaining $14,000 in
37 The client's evaluation of a given outcome can also be greatly effected by his or her
emotional state. A bad offer conveyed sympathetically may seem more desirable that a
good offer conveyed with hostility. The cognitive science research indicates that whatever
else is going on, people will still tend to seek risk to avoid a loss and are risk adverse if they
perceive the situation as one that involves protecting a gain. See infra notes 89-92 and
accompanying text.
38 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Introduction to KAHNEMAN ET AL., supra note
2, at 14-20 (defining adjustment and anchoring as the tendency for "different starting
points [to] yield different estimates, which are biased toward the initial values).
39 Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement:
An Experimental Approach, 93 MIcH. L. REv. 107, 129-140 (1994) (discussing how anchor-
ing and framing in litigation decisions leads to "loss aversion," or the willingness to accept
greater risk to avoid a result perceived as a loss than the degree of risk acceptable if the
same change in economic position is perceived as a gain).
40 This example is from Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 24, at 88-93.
41 The amount of the recovery depended on the judge's ruling on a legal matter that
could limit the damages to $10,000. There was a 50% chance of a favorable ruling, in
which case the damages would be $28,000 and a 50% chance of an unfavorable ruling, in
which case the recovery would only be $10,000. Id. The expected value of the litigation is
$19,000, the mid point between the two equally likely outcomes. The settlement offer of
$21,000 is $2,000 more than the expected value of litigation.
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damages was the total loss of an older Toyota for which there was no
collision insurance. The gainers could see themselves as profiting
from the settlement; they could take the $21,000, replace the $14,000
car and still have $7000 remaining.
The other group, which I will call the losers, was told that they
had incurred $4000 in medical expenses, also already reimbursed. The
remaining $24,000 in damages was the total loss of a BMW, for which
there was no collision insurance. The losers could see this offer as a
loss because they would still needing another $7000 to replace their
lost cars. The losers settled at a lower rate than the gainers.42 The
difference in settlement rates is irrational, at least to an economist.
The losers acted as though they were choosing between this settle-
ment and getting their BMWs back. But that was not the relevant
comparison. For both groups, the relevant comparison in making this
choice, at least on the numbers, is between the settlement offer and
the probable value of going to trial (the likelihood of winning multi-
plied by the likely award). 43 Comparing the offer and the out of
pocket loss or gain is simply not relevant to comparing the value of
settlement with the value of the trial. But it is the perception of loss
or gain that often weighs more heavily upon us than logic.
This is the same phenomenon that causes many people to hold
losing stocks. Although solid data shows that long term profits are
maximized by selling losing stocks and reinvesting the proceeds in
other equities, many of us resist selling at a loss. We tend to hold a
losing stock, intending to sell it only when its price rises so we can
avoid that apparent loss. In the meantime, we lose more money fore-
going other investment opportunities. Gain foregone is much less
cognitively pressing than loss recognized.
Framing bias explains why the initial evaluation of a legal situa-
tion such as Mr. Worth's can have such a dramatic impact on his deci-
sion making. If a lawyer paints a bleak picture, the actual plea offer
will often sound like a significant gain in comparison. 44 Given that
42 Korobkin and Guthrie report that the Toyota group indicated an average response of
4.43 between "definitely accept" and "probably accept", while the BMW group, at 3.64,
was somewhat below "probably accept" on a five position scale of (5) definitely accept, (4)
probably accept, (3) undecided, (2) probably reject and (1) definitely reject. The results
are statistically significant. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 24, at 90, 100. They also note,
"[p]erhaps more telling, only one Toyota Driver out of forty-two subjects said he or she
would "probably reject" or "definitely reject" the offer, in contrast to nine of forty-four
BMW drivers who would "probably reject" or "definitely reject" the offer, with an addi-
tional seven undecided." Id. at 100. Although most of the subjects would accept the offer
in either case, at the margins framing makes a difference and the margins can be quite
wide.
43 That is, the $21,000 settlement compared to the $19,000 expected value of litigation.
44 DePippa, supra note 5, at 111 (discussing how framing bias leads to excessive rates of
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people tend to avoid perceived loss and seek perceived gain, that cli-
ent will have a greater tendency to accept a plea offer preceded by
bad news. In contrast, an early suggestion that an acquittal is possible,
often made in an effort to build rapport with clients who feel com-
pelled to vociferously maintain their innocence when they first meet
their lawyer,45 may frame all future plea discussions as losses. Of
course the key comparison is between the plea and the likely result of
other choices, not between the client's understanding of the lawyer's
initial impression and the plea offer. But the initial frame makes a big
cognitive difference. Lawyers can manipulate clients46 in these initial
discussions.47 Premature evaluation can cause a defendant to em-
brace the risk of a trial that he might otherwise avoid or to accept an
offer because it is better than some bad outcome that would never
guilty pleas). For an interesting argument that also analyzes the impact of framing on pleas
but may not account for the particular incentives in federal narcotics cases, see, Richard
Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 205 (arguing that
irrationally high rates of guilty pleas are caused, in part, by framing effects).
45 A variety of pressures can lead lawyers and clients to expressions of overconfidence
early in a case. Lawyers in private practice often need to reassure new or prospective
clients about their zeal and skill. Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J.
69, 120-26 (1995) (arguing that retained counsel must build and retain reputations as tough,
zealous advocates for innocence). This encourages strong claims by the lawyer at the out-
set of the case. Institutional defenders, on the other hand, may face pressures that en-
courage them to use framing bias in order to counsel clients to plead guilty. Birke, supra
note 44, at 240-42. From the clients' point of view, meeting their lawyers for the first time
may impel them to vigorously claim innocence because they think they will get better rep-
resentation if the lawyer believes that claim.
46 Stephen Ellmann has suggested that manipulation has two principal elements.
"First, is an effort by one person to guide another's thoughts or actions in a direction
desired by the person guiding. Second, the manipulator seeks this goal by means that un-
dercut the other person's ability to make a choice that is truly his own." Stephen Ellmann,
Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 726 (1987). For a full discussion of Ellmann's
subtle and insightful views on the difficulties of respecting client autonomy see, John K.
Morris, Power and Responsibility Among Lawyers and Clients: Comment on Ellmann's
Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 781 (1987) and Stephen Ellmann, Manipulation by
Client and Context: A Response to Professor Morris, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1003 (1987). Clients
vary greatly in their susceptibility to lawyer domination and manipulation. Some clients
consider their appointed criminal defense lawyer a figure of great authority and present as,
and sometimes actually are, anxious to cede control. Others consider their appointed law-
yers useless at best and covert prosecutors at worst and are strongly disinclined to follow
the lawyer's advice.
47 Clients also have access to other sources of information about potential penalties and
typical outcomes. Incarcerated prisoners share information and misinformation, family
and friends offer their views and court proceedings provide information. Although FED. R.
CRIM. P. 5 does not require notice of the maximum penalty at an initial appearance, it is
often discussed as part of the argument for pretrial release. Many judicial officers will also
include that information in the formal notice of the charges in the complaint. Maximum
sentences in federal law are typically very high and some research suggests that very high
or low anchors are most powerful. PLOUS, supra note 27, at 152. The mention a high
maximum sentence at initial appearance may set a high anchor and encourage pleas by
making even unexceptional plea offers more appealing.
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actually come to pass.
The potential for damage from premature evaluation and framing
is heightened by hindsight bias, the general tendency to view past
events as having been more predictable than they were at the time,
makes framing errors hard to see. Events take on a cast of inevitabil-
ity in hindsight, even when they seemed quite uncertain in prospect
and we do not recall the mistakes from which we might learn.
Consider our view of an upcoming local election. Suppose we
think a first time candidate may win a local election because her views
on development of open space are shared by many new residents who
did not vote in the last election. We might be unsure, however, how
many new residents there are and whether they will vote in the local
election. On election morning we feel the outcome is promising for
the first time candidate, but uncertain. After the event, when the new
candidate wins, we look back on her election as a certainty and re-
member that we knew it all along. The apparent memory of knowing
it all along, when in fact we were uncertain before the event, is hind-
sight bias.
In order to understand hindsight bias, we must first recognize that
memory is a dynamic process of reconstruction. We do not pull mem-
ories fully formed from a file cabinet in our minds, but rather assem-
ble pieces of the memory each time we recall an event.48
Experimental data suggests that hindsight bias begins when we re-
place or update information about an event or situation with more
current information. Then we use the updated information, instead of
the old information, when we next construct the relevant memory. 49
In this example, when we think about the election before the event,
we use our uncertain information about voter turnout. Then the elec-
tion gives us better information on that topic and we replace the un-
certain information. Now we have more reliable information that the
new voters were, in fact, a large bloc of actual voters. When next we
48 Each instance of remembering requires reconstruction, rather than a simple act of
recalling an intact image. Daniel L. Schacter, Memory Distortion: History and Current Sta-
tus, in Daniel L. Schacter, ed., MEMORY DISTORTION, 19 (1995) ("the idea that storage and
retrieval of explicit memories involves binding together different kinds of information
from diverse cortical sites provides a biological basis for the notion that retrieval of a mem-
ory is a complex construction involving many different sources of information-not a simple
playback of a stored image."); James L. McClelland, Constructive Memory and Memory
Distortions: A Parallel-Distributed Processing Approach, in MEMORY DISTORTION at 69-70
(noting the groundbreaking work of F.C. Bartlett and U. Neisser in developing the idea
that memory is a constructive process).
49 Ulrich Hoffrage & Ralph Hertwig, Hindsight Bias: A Price Worth Paying for Fast and
Frugal Memory, in GERD GIGERENZER, PETER M. TODD & THE ABC RESEARCH GROUP,
SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE Us SMART at 191 (1999) (theorizing that replacing out-
dated information with updated data during memory recall promotes fast, frugal and accu-
rate thinking, at the price of hindsight bias).
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seek information about the likelihood of that group voting, we find we
are quite certain about that fact. We plug that information in when we
reconstruct our memory of our earlier prediction and find that we
knew it all along.
Although replacing the old information for all purposes leads us
astray in remembering our earlier uncertainty, it is generally quite ef-
ficient. Replacing old incorrect information with more reliable data
will lead to better predictions. That is a desirable outcome. Yet, when
we ask ourselves about the past, it will make the result seem more
certain than it was. We will recall that the candidate was supported by
this large bloc of people who actually turn out to vote - how else could
the election have come out? While it is possible to search our long
term memory to recall our earlier uncertainty, typically we do not.
Instead, we use the more efficient strategy of reevaluating the ques-
tion in the light of our current, and more reliable, information.
50
In legal counseling and decision making, hindsight bias can reen-
force the dangers of premature decision making. Hindsight bias will
make Mr. Worth, as it makes all of us, less sensitive to the contingent,
uncertain nature of our decision making. In retrospect, events seem
and feel much more orderly, predictable and inevitable than they ap-
peared in prospect. As we will see later, hindsight bias is just one
reason why people do not tend to critically evaluate 51 the information
upon which they base their decisions.5 2 After all, we have all made a
host of decisions in our pasts and they fit together in an almost seam-
less web of inevitable events. There is no reason to begin to question
our judgment.
Perhaps the answer is obvious in the Worth case - Mr. Worth
faces a serious situation and must handle the case with great care. It
may not, however, be so obvious in the moment that a criminal case
requires one to reevaluate how to think about probabilities and infor-
mation validity. That is not most people's experience of the effects of
a life crisis. Indeed, it should not be. Optimism, confidence in one's
abilities and a sense that the world is predictable are generally adap-
tive traits, but may not be optimal.53 Sensitive ears may help us hear a
50 For an overview of hindsight bias see, Baruch Fischoff, For Those Condemned to
Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, in KAHNEMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at
335. For research on the effect of hindsight bias on litigation, see Guthrie, Rachlinski &
Wistrich, supra note 27, at 780.
51 Confirmatory bias, or the tendency to attend to and use evidence that supports a
position we already hold also militates against successful critical evaluation of our own
ideas. Lee Ross and Craig Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the Ori-
gins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments in KAHNEMAN ET AL., supra note 2,
at 149.
52 See infra note 83 and accompanying text on egocentric bias.
53 For discussion of the role of affect, see infra 91 and accompanying text.
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predator rustling grass, but are ill suited to satisfy an appetite for loud
rock concerts.
We should resist the temptation to make early diagnoses and pre-
dictions. Clients will frequently ask for predictions early in a case.
But answering those questions can have serious unintended conse-
quences. Even tentative, offhand comments can feed the cognitive
tendency to make rapid judgments that may diverge from the results
of a more carefully considered analysis. The danger of biasing future
decisions outweighs the claim that respect for clients requires that we
answer their questions as best we can and emphasize that early judg-
ment is very tentative and uncertain.
There are dangers at both extremes. We would be wrong to offer
an assessment at the very first moment, but also wrong to withhold
assessment as the case progresses. We are neither completely rational,
nor wholly irrational. Respect for client autonomy should not be
equated with ignoring the complexities of human decision making, nor
should our understanding of some aspects of human reasoning tempt
us into thinking we know our client's mind better than does he or she.
The skillful legal counselor must have enough expertise to use appro-
priate tools to gather and evaluate information and help clients use it
effectively. Respect for our clients requires us to use our expertise
and best judgment. 54
B. The First Counseling Session
Three days later Mr. Worth was detained without bail. 55 I went
to see him at the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) the fol-
lowing day. He had been in custody for five days56 and was scared,
anxious and a bit angry. We talked about his experiences over the
past several days and his feelings about what had happened since his
arrest. I described my conversations with his brothers and their con-
cern for him. We talked about the detention hearing and the chances
54 See generally, DePippa, supra note 5 (arguing that counseling informed by prospect
theory will recognize that neither client or lawyer is perfectly rational and will steer a
pragmatic course between the ideological poles of client centered and lawyer centered
counseling).
55 In 1999, 70.9% of the narcotics trafficking defendants who had a detention hearing
were detained. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STA-
TISTICS, 1999, Table 3.5 http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfjs9903.pdf. Mr. Worth,
however, had a reasonable chance to have bail set. He is an American citizen with a stable
residence, a job and no prior record. The government prevailed by arguing the statutory
presumption, the lengthy potential sentence, the strength of their evidence and the fact
that a co-defendant carried a gun. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2002) (listing factors relevant to
bail determinations).
56 He was arrested on day one, had a bail hearing on day four and I saw him again on
day five.
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for getting him released later in the case. After a while, Mr. Worth
asked me about the case and what I thought would happen. This was
the beginning of my legal counseling of Mr. Worth. He was now ask-
ing me to make the predictions upon which he would likely rely to
decide how to handle the case.
A litigator's predictions about the likely outcome of a dispute are
at the core of his or her expertise. My predictions about Mr. Worth's
case reflect my underlying assumptions about lawyering in a federal
narcotics case and provide the context within which I counsel him.
My conception of the criminal defense lawyer's role reflects the norms
of the legal community in which I practice. In my experience, the
criminal defense bar strongly espouses the hired gun theory of law-
yering - people who may have done bad things deserve zealous advo-
cates and the lawyers are not responsible for their clients' bad acts or
the decisions the clients make in defending themselves against the
power of the state. Criminal defense lawyers also tend to offer strong
advice in counseling, rather than laying out options and leaving con-
clusions to the client. With so much at stake and so much power ar-
rayed against them, institutional and appointed criminal defense
lawyers feel little call to watch out for anyone but their client.57 The
powerful private bar that practices in this courthouse reenforces the
hired gun norm. Wealthy and powerful clients pay well for the zeal-
ous, non-judgmental lawyers they desire. 58 The district also has a long
tradition of prosecutors coming from and returning to large firm pri-
vate practice. All these factors have contributed to local norms that
encourage strong advocacy and relatively professional relationships
between the defense bar and prosecutors. 59
57 This is the modern criminal defense lawyer first championed in the academy by
Monroe Freedman. He has become the standardbearer for this mainstream view. See gen-
erally MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHiICS 123 (1990) (defending
the partisan advocate in the adversary system). He was, however, famously threatened
with professional discipline after publishing an earlier defense of zealous criminal defense
lawyering. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966) (defending vigorous
cross examination of truthful witnesses, client confidentiality and leaving the choice to of-
fer apparently false testimony to the defendant).
Zealous advocacy is generally less ethically challenging than the literature might sug-
gest. Although it is theoretically useful to posit extreme cases, such as the neutral witness
whose adultery would be revealed on cross examination with devastating consequences to
his very sympathetic family, that is not the typical experience for either lawyer or client.
58 The best description of the powerful criminal defense bar in New York City is still
KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT
WORK (1985) (describing the results of an in-depth study of some members of the white
collar defense bar in New York).
59 These norms include judges and adversaries expecting and accepting extensive mo-
tion practice, novel legal arguments and vigorous argument and examination of witnesses.
In some communities, but not this one, defense lawyers are less comfortable with zealous
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Counterbalancing this strong ethic of zealous advocacy is the high
rate of conviction in narcotics cases and the lengthy sentences many
defendants face. Trials of narcotics cases frequently end in conviction.
In this case, the evidence appears strong.60 The complaint recites re-
corded conversations, observation of my client handling a package
that contained narcotics and the likely testimony of a confidential in-
formant. Trial also offers the only hope, albeit a small one, of com-
plete exoneration. A guilty plea under the sentencing guidelines and
mandatory minimum narcotics statutes offers a predictable discount
of between 20% and 40% off the lowest likely sentence following con-
viction by trial. 61 Cooperation with the government, the third path in
the federal system, is likely to lead to a significant sentence reduction,
although the precise discount is less predictable and ranges between
50% and 80% of the likely sentence after trial.62
advocacy on behalf of unpopular clients. The importance of local custom and practice has
become more visible under the sentencing guidelines, see Ian Weinstein, Regulating the
Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563, 608 (1999) (discussing how plea and sentencing
practices develop and vary at the local level).
60 Some readers may be troubled by this very negative evaluation of the case at this
early stage. It is problematic. I have just warned about the dangers of early diagnosis and
such an early and negative evaluation cuts against the aggressive investigation and litiga-
tion that should characterize zealous advocacy. I have sometimes litigated cases that at an
early stage appeared very likely to end badly, but ended in acquittal, dismissal, or some
other very favorable result. Unfortunately from the defense perspective, that result is un-
common. More importantly, there is often a price for careful decision making. In federal
narcotics prosecutions in New York, rapid decision making is strongly reenforced by the
high premium on early cooperation. The first person in the case to turn against others is
most likely to receive a much shorter sentence than others. An early decision to cooperate
with the government includes, as one of its costs, giving up the opportunity to litigate the
case and learn if the government has, or develops, proof problems.
61 Some evidence suggests the guidelines have increased the sentence differential be-
tween trial and plea and made it less predictable. Chantale LaCasse and A. Abigail Payne,
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Do Defendants Bargain
in the Shadow of the Judge? 42 J. L. & ECON. 245 (1999) (finding that judges shifted their
post-guidelines sentencing patterns to enhance the sentencing penalties for going to trial
and maintain high plea rates). The sentencing guidelines discount for a plea is between
20% and 40% of the probable sentence after trial. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MAN-
UAL, § 3E1.1, Acceptance of Responsibility (2001) (defendants may receive a downward
adjustment of up to three levels for pleading guilty and accepting responsibility for their
conduct). The actual discount for a plea is more difficult to predict because charging deci-
sions often have more impact on the sentence than the sentencing guidelines. As defen-
dants indicate willingness to contest the charges, additional investigation often leads to
additional charges and/or additional relevant conduct, which is uncharged conduct "that
occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction." Id. at §1B1.3, Relevant Con-
duct. Post trial sentences two and three times harsher than sentences predicted by plea
offers are not uncommon.
62 High rates of conviction and significant sentencing discounts for pleas are just the
most obvious pressures on defendants to plead guilty. Although critical attention has been
paid to lawyering which encourages pleas, see Birke, supra note 44, and there are many
institutional defenders and appointed lawyers in highly stressed systems who cannot meet
the norm of adequately engaging and counseling their clients, Note, Gideon's Promise Un-
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There is often a high price to pursuing the classic adversarial
route to trial. For me, zealous advocacy for my clients charged with
federal narcotics offenses has become zealous harm reduction. 63 Most
of my clients are going to be punished. I see myself as trying to sepa-
rate out the many likely pleas from the very few cases which should be
tried. Once those two groups are separated, the tasks are to win the
trials and minimize the sentences for those who plead or are found
guilty. With those norms and preferences as the backdrop, I started to
answer Mr. Worth's question about what I thought would happen in
his case.
I began with a general description of the conspiracy law, empha-
sizing that knowledge of and agreement to participate in illegal activi-
ties are the essential elements of a conspiracy. Then I described the
federal criminal justice system and the paths narcotics cases can
travel.64 I discussed dismissal and acquittal, and emphasized the many
fulfilled: the Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062, 2064
(2000) (noting the severe and persistent deficiencies in indigent defense and arguing for a
litigation approach), that is a flaw in the system, not the lawyers. The central problem is
the lack of adequate resources and the persistence of norms that discourage zealous advo-
cacy, not the lawyers' role conception or the rules. We do not need more lawyer regula-
tion. We need courts, defenders and prosecutors with the resources and will to ensure that
defendants are treated fairly.
63 1 am attempting to report and analyze what actually happens when my clients, and 1,
make decisions in a narcotics case. I see no evidence that my own lawyering reflects partic-
ularly strong insight into my own cognitive or other biases. I know that my conscious
characterization of my federal criminal defense lawyering is that it is proactive, data driven
and harm reduction oriented. In other words, I try to use my own experiences and what
data I can gather to make the best predictions I can about what is likely to happen to a
given case and take an active, affirmative stance in the litigation as early as possible.
Of course what I label a "data driven" approach can only inform, but cannot drive,
criminal defense decisions. For one thing, I have done some formal data analysis, but I
cannot claim to be making statistically valid inferences in all, or even much, of my law-
yering. More importantly, the rules make it indefensible to try one hundred cases that
might be pled to a lower sentence because two or three of the juries will unpredictably
reject the government's evidence.
Although I cherish the acquittals and dismissals my clients have gotten, I am more
frequently trying to minimize the negative consequences of criminal charges, not eliminate
them. I sometimes fear this may reflect my personal tendency toward risk aversion, rather
than an optimal analysis of the situation, but reflection and experience have strengthened
my commitment to this view (predictably so, given hindsight bias).
I contrast this approach with the risk seeking, "ready for trial" lawyer, a style I am
quite strongly drawn to in our law school clinic misdemeanor practice. In those low stakes
cases, in which there are many dismissals, acquittals and last minute offers of very
favorable resolutions, the context rewards reluctance to compromise and encourages risk
taking. If I were a defendant, however, I would be strongly attracted to a lawyer who
talked very tough and assured me he or she could get me an acquittal, especially in high
stakes cases. Richman, supra note 45, at 111-26 (analyzing lawyers' incentives and disin-
centives to representing cooperators in a variety of contexts).
64 Mr. Worth and I have discussed the facts of the case very briefly. I choose to explain
the law before interviewing about the facts. This sequencing presents the specter of attor-
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uncertainties at this early stage of the case. Then I told Mr. Worth
that most people in his situation must choose among trial, a plea of
guilty or cooperation and a plea of guilty. I tried to emphasize that
this was his case, his life and that the decision would be his when the
time came to make a decision.
This general outline led us to a more detailed discussion of each
alternative. I started with trial. 65 I explained what evidence I thought
the jury would hear and the available defense theories. I concluded
that based on what I knew at that time, it seemed likely he would be
convicted. 66 Conviction after trial would likely result in a sentence of
ney coaching, which has come to be known as the Anatomy of a Murder problem. See
ROBERT TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER (1958). For an insightful discussion of this
problem, see, Stephen Ellmann, Case Studies in Legal Ethics: Truth and Consequences, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 895 (2000) (arguing that lawyers should start with the premise that
clients are honest but be alert for warning signs that the client is not honest and be pre-
pared to use certain techniques to respond).
65 The sequencing of the presentation of alternatives is among the most difficult tech-
nique issues in counseling a client about resolving a pending criminal case. My practice is
to start with trial, move on to plea and then discuss cooperation. I do this because trial is
the default option and a constitutional right. In the absence of any choice by the defen-
dant, the government will bring the case to trial, as the constitution requires. Perhaps most
importantly, it is impossible to examine the other choices without considering trial first, as
it offers the only possibility of the optimal outcome, acquittal. One must understand the
chances for the most desirable outcome in order to compare it to the other options. Al-
though I think the sequencing is right, it may encourage a plea with or without coopera-
tion. The defendant hears a nice theoretical possibility, acquittal, which turns out to be
nearly impossible to achieve. Then I tell a story in which the problem, likely conviction
and long sentence, is resolved by plea, with or without cooperation. This is the classical
story arc of stasis, trouble and resolution.
66 One way to evaluate the likelihood of conviction is to consider that 60,255 defen-
dants were "disposed of" in the federal courts in 1996. Dismissals accounted for 7,083 of
those defendants. Of the remaining 53,172 defendants, 4,976, (9.4% of the defendants
whose cases were not dismissed) went to trial. Of those 4,976 defendants who went to trial,
902 (18% of all defendants who went to trial) were acquitted and 4074 (82% of all defen-
dants who went to trial) were convicted. The remaining 48,196 (90.6% of the defendants
whose cases were not dismissed) entered pleas of guilty or nolo contendre. BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, tbl.5.27 (1996) [here-
inafter SOURCEBOOK]. The rate of trials in the state courts appears similar, with an aver-
age plea rate of 89% reported for felony convictions in state courts in 1994. Id. at tbl.5.52.
Thus, of those whose cases were not dismissed, 902 out of the 53,172 were acquitted, or
1.7% of the total. It bears noting that the 9.4% of defendants who elect to go to trial
include a significant number with better than average chances of success, so Mr. Worth's
case might better be compared to the subgroup of cases with relatively stronger govern-
ment evidence. Of course there are many other ways to think about these numbers. If one
includes all the dismissals and acquittals, then 7985 out of 60,255, or 13% of those against
whom prosecutions were initiated, walked away from the real threat of criminal sanction
without any finding against them. Most dismissals, however, do not come from among the
cases involving multi-kilo drug deals with tapes of the defendant at issue. The statistical
probability of conviction after trial for the relevant subgroup of defendants appears to be
above 95%. Of course, the predictions in this footnote, and in this section, are the product
of bounded rationality, not statistically valid regression analysis. The accuracy of the
heuristics used to separate the good and bad cases is the key to this evaluation. Almost all
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between ten and twelve years in prison.67
Next I described the process of pleading guilty. I discussed poten-
tial plea offers and talked about the process of negotiating and enter-
ing into a plea agreement. I detailed the sentencing benefits that can
be gained from giving up the right to a trial and potential appeal. I
told Mr. Worth that if he chose to plead guilty, the sentence would
likely be between 5 and 6 1h years.68
I came last to a plea and cooperation with the government in the
investigation and prosecution of others. I described the government's
strong interest in cooperation and emphasized that the prosecutor has
almost complete control in this area. The prosecutor may refuse to
consider cooperation, he or she may have extensive meetings with the
defendant and then reject the cooperation and even if the prosecutor
accepts the defendant's assistance, there are no promises about how
much the defendant will benefit. But when cooperation works, as it
often does, defendants receive much shorter sentences. If Mr. Worth
cooperated, there was a good chance that his sentence would fall be-
tween 2 and 31/2 years, and an extremely high probability that the sen-
tence would be no longer than 41/2 years. 69
the uncertainty, in the general run of cases, is about the length of the sentence, not the fact
of conviction.
67 I also explained that there is no parole in the federal system and most people serve
85% of the sentence imposed, after a 15% reduction for good behavior.
68 The sentence in a federal narcotics case is determined by a complex set of statutes
and rules. Those statutes and rules are applied quite differently from district to district as
each group of prosecutors, judges and defense lawyers has developed its own practices.
See Frank Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of
Declining Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 87 IOWA LAW
REVIEW 477, 532-4 (2002) (discussing variation from district to district). A thorough un-
derstanding of federal sentencing law and local practice is crucial to adequately handle a
matter such as this. See Douglas A. Berman, From Lawlessness to Too Much Law? Ex-
ploring the Risk of Dispparity from Differences in Defense Counsel Under Guidelines Sen-
tencing, 87 IOWA LAW REVIEW 435 (2002) (arguing that defense counsel's knowledge and
skill can have a significant impact on the ultimate sentence, despite the apparent rigidity of
the federal sentencing guidelines). My experience in this courthouse suggests that Mr.
Worth is likely to be eligible for first offender treatment, permitting a judge to sentence
below the ten year statutory mandatory minimum which would otherwise apply, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2002). If the judge had legal authority to sentence below the
mandatory minimum the next consideration would be the sentencing guidelines. The start-
ing point for a conspiracy involving 5 to 15 kilos of cocaine would be a range of 121-151
months. A first offender who pleads guilty is eligible for a 5 level downward adjustment, in
the trial judge's reviewable discretion, to a range as low as 70-87 months. Further down-
ward adjustments are possible but seem very unlikely at this stage. In about two thirds of
all cases, judges impose sentences at the bottom of the sentencing range. A sentence of 70
months, plus or minus a year, appears very likely at this time, if Mr. Worth accepts a stan-
dard plea offer.
69 Once the government moves for cooperation departure, the judge has virtually unre-
viewable discretion to decide if and how much to depart. The scope of these departures
varies widely from district to district. See, Patti B. Saris, Below the Radar Screens: Have the
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As we talked, it seemed to me that Mr. Worth understood what I
was telling him. He asked reasonable questions and made relevant
comments. He had particular interest in the likely conduct and out-
come of a trial of his case. He expressed interest in my thoughts about
possible defense theories and understood that the heart of a conspir-
acy case is the proof that the defendant knowingly agreed to partici-
pate in illegal activity. Because Mr. Worth was arrested at the time of
the alleged offense and in close proximity to drugs, mistaken identifi-
cation did not seem like a promising defense theory.70 Although we
had not yet heard the audiotapes, Mr. Worth told me that he was care-
ful never to say "cocaine" or "drugs" on the phone. Although I told
him that most people could usually figure out that a conversation
about "the things" or "packages" was at least consistent with a drug
deal, we spent little time speculating about the tapes. Putting aside
the tapes for now, how could we argue that the jury should have a
reasonable doubt about his knowledge that there was cocaine in the
bag in the trunk of the car?
The centerpiece of the government's evidence against Mr. Worth
would be the testimony of a confidential informant. The CI, as such a
witness is known, is almost always some character with a shady past,
including a criminal record, who helps the government make drug
cases in return for money. Most defense lawyers will agree that it is a
pleasure to cross examine a CI. They have a strong motive to lie, the
essence of their work is duplicity and they. almost always have unsa-
vory pasts. I have cross examined confidential informants and cooper-
ators with some success. Juries tend to dislike and distrust them, but
often find their testimony sufficiently corroborated in narcotics cases
to justify a conviction. The defense always has a great deal to say
about why such witnesses are not worthy of belief. It is extremely
helpful, however, to have additional evidence beyond the distasteful
character of the main witness, to support the theme that the govern-
ment's evidence is unreliable and inaccurate.
Sentencing Guidelines Eliminated Disparity? One Judge's Perspective, 30 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 1027, 1045-46 (1997) (commenting on warranted versus unwarranted disparity and
the failure to control the magnitude of departures from the perspective of one of the
United States District Court Judges for the District of Massachusetts). My experience in
this courthouse, which involves between 25 and 50 cooperators, along with my academic
research, tells me that the judge will give a sentence discount in virtually every SDNY case
in which the government recommends a substantial assistance departure and that the few
in which the judge rejects the request involve special circumstances which give counsel
some warning of that possibility. In non-violent narcotics cases, in which offenders do not
have significant prior records or present other issues, my consistent experience is that the
discount is between 50% and 80%.
70 Mistaken voice identification could have explained the audiotapes, but his presence
at the scene would still be a problem to which we did not yet have a solution.
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Mr. Worth understood all this clearly enough to move the conver-
sation to the flaw in the evidence that he believed would compel the
jury to vote not guilty. "It says they took a box from the car," he
observed, gesturing toward the papers on the table in front of us.
"Yes," I agreed, "the complaint says it was a box."
"Well, you know they are going to have a bag in court, unless
they switch the evidence."
"No," I assured him, "I think the evidence in court will be
whatever they took from the car. They do some nasty things, but in
my experience they don't just lie about the evidence."
"So that's it," he said emphatically, "the jury has to know the
evidence is all crap. They can't convict me on this."
I did not share Mr. Worth's evaluation of the evidence, but I did
not press him on this point. I only said, "I'm not sure the jury will see
it that way, but there is still a lot we don't know about the evidence."
It was our second meeting.
1. Representativeness Bias
Mr. Worth's focus on this one detail, the complaint's mistaken
assertion that the drugs were in a box, rather than a bag, was familiar
to me. Mr. Worth was not my first client to place great reliance on a
point I did not raise and which I thought unlikely to play a major role
in the case. This tendency is the result of a cognitive illusion. His
overestimation of the significance of a single event is an example of
the representativeness bias, our cognitively rooted tendency to gener-
alize from whatever small, unrepresentative sample captures our at-
tention.71 This bias causes us to give undue weight to rare but
conspicuous events and undervalue or ignore more common occur-
rences.72 We worry more about rare plane crashes than about all too
71 Tversky and Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, in KAHNEMAN ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 23, 24.
72 The cognitive attraction of detail can lead us to think an event more likely if it is
described with greater detail, even though the added details actually make the event less
likely than it would be without the qualifier. This is the conjunction fallacy, in which a
more specific event or condition is misanalyzed as more likely than the related general
case. In a now classic, and not entirely uncontroversial experiment, subjects were asked to
rank a set of statements about a tennis players from most to least likely. The four choices
were:
1. Borg will win the match
2. Borg will lose the first set.
3. Borg will win the first set but lose the match
4. Borg will lose the first set but win the match
Respondents thought 1 most likely - they thought Borg would win the match. Interest-
ingly, they ranked 4 as more likely than 2, with 3 coming last. Yet analytically, statement 2
is more likely than statement 4, because statement 2 describes a more general case than
statement 4. Statement 2 includes the cases in which the player loses the first set and wins
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common car accidents. 73 We overemphasize the rare event because of
our cognitive disposition to focus on individual examples whose de-
tails match our images of a general case. Tending to disregard
whether the individual case is a typical or atypical example of the cat-
egory, we give too much weight to its vividness. Plane crashes are
vivid, highly representative exemplars of a deadly accident, 74 but that
does not increase their statistical probability.75
Statistical probability, however, offers a good method for making
the predictions lawyers and their clients so often need. Perhaps we
want to know if the plaintiff is likely to win at trial. The best way to
predict the likelihood of a contingent future event is to calculate sta-
tistical probability. Although many of us are put off by the technical
details, the basic idea is simple enough. A tort lawyer may want to
evaluate a new slip and fall case.76 His judgment is informed by ten
the match, as well as though in which the player loses the first set and loses the match. The
addition of the vivid detail makes us focus on the more specific case; we understand and
are attracted to the story of losing the first set but winning the match and prefer it to the
more probable, but bare story of just losing the first set. The example is from Tversky &
Kahneman, Judgments of and by Representativeness, in KAINEMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at
96.
73 For transportation safety data see, U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Bureau of Transpor-
tation Statistics, Transportation Statistics Annual Report, 2000, http://www.bts.gov/bt-
sprod/nts/. Airline accidents accounted for 92 deaths in 2000. 41,800 people died in
highway accidents, including all kinds of vehicles and pedestrians. Id. at Table 1, Fatalities
by Transportation Mode. The FAA warns that airline accidents are rare, so predictions
and comparisons among carriers are difficult, http://www.asy.faa.gov/safety-data/#cautions.
74 Representativeness contributes to the general unease many feel about flying, along
with other factors, such as the cramped surroundings, lack of control and unfamiliarity of
the experience. Of course we have a whole new set of concerns about flying since Septem-
ber 11.
75 Representativeness may be the best known, but least clearly understood of the cog-
nitive biases. It is not subject to precise definition. Tversky & Kahneman, Subjective
Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, in KAHNEMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 33.
Although there is debate about the mechanism, there is strong evidence that people over-
emphasize predictive power of rare phenomena when the phenomena strongly resemble
the category in question. Recognition of this problem is behind the restrictions on proof of
character in evidence law. We limit character quite strictly because it is too powerful and
persuasive, see Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 485 (1948). That is the power of
the representativeness illusion. A bad person, in whatever dimension, looks much more
like a guilty person, without accounting for the very large number of bad people who do
not commit crimes. See generally, Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Be-
havioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 1051, 1086 (2000).
76 Predictions about litigation often involve subjective judgments. Beysian decision
theory, "[a] method of decision making and, by extension, of estimating probabilities,
based at least in part on expert opinion, called "subjective" probability," W. PAUL VOGT,
DICTIONARY OF STATISTICS AND METHODOLOGY, is well accepted and permits an element
of subjective judgment to be included in a mathematically rigorous analysis. For applica-
tion of some formal methods from decision theory to litigation, including an example, see
Marjorie Anne McDiarmid, Lawyer Decision Making: The Problem of Prediction, 1992
Wis. L. REV. 1847, 1852-1868. Some may be familiar with decision trees, a graphic repre-
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other slip and fall cases he or she has litigated over the past six
months. The lawyer must, however, use care when he compares the
current case to those ten cases.77
The lawyer may evaluate the new case as moderately strong, com-
pared to the ten known cases. To make a useful judgment, the lawyer
must also account for how this set of comparison cases fits into the
larger group of all possible cases. If the lawyer won only one of those
ten cases, a moderately strong case in that group is not very promis-
ing. If the lawyer won half the cases and the cases were fairly evenly
distributed along the spectrum, then a moderately strong case is quite
promising. To put it another way, if the ten cases are typical, or we
can figure out how to use them to understand the overall rates of suc-
cess in this sort of case, it is useful to generalize from the comparison.
If, however, the lawyer remembers those ten cases because they are
his only victories or each happens to have a memorable fact, then
those ten cases may not make a suitable baseline.
Collecting good base rate information and using it effectively is
the key to making good predictions based on past experiences. 78 If
the wrong base rate is chosen, the prediction will be useless. Unfortu-
nately, it is hard for lawyers to collect reliable base rate information
about litigation outcomes. Individual differences among cases make it
hard to identify which typical cases provide the right comparisons. 79
Even when good information is available, the representative heuristic
causes many of us to systematically ignore the information and sys-
tematically misinterpret it when we do use it.80 The fundamental
problem is that people are just not very good at distinguishing typical
events from rare events. In fact, we are strongly drawn to rare or
vivid events and often make the mistake of thinking them common
and typical. 81
Although the representativeness heuristic makes us bad intuitive
statisticians, it very often leads to useful judgments in the world. The
sentation of decision theory analysis.
77 "In general, three types of information are relevant to statistical prediction: (a) prior
or background information (e.g., base rates ... ); (b) specific evidence concerning the indi-
vidual case.. .; (c) the expected accuracy of prediction..." Kahneman & Tversky, On the
Psychology of Prediction, in KAHNEMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 51.
78 Id. at 48-50.
79 Services that collect and report damage awards in tort cases are one important exam-
ple of the importance and limitations of good base rate information in litigation.
80 See supra note 21, collecting studies showing experts misanalyze and misapply base
rate information.
81 This is a particularly difficult problem in medical diagnosis. Doctors must account
for how often a given symptom or condition occurs in the general population in order to
understand how strongly related it is to a particular pathology. The fact that 10% of all
brain tumors are associated with headaches is not very meaningful unless one knows
whether the incidence of headaches in the general population is 1%, 10% or 40%.
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heuristic works by exploiting the surprising power of "one reason de-
cision making."' 82 The notion is that we can often efficiently and use-
fully categorize a situation by attending to just one fact or cue about
it. For illustration, we return to the state of nature. If I was sitting
out on the plain and saw the grass rustle, I would have a strong inter-
est in being able to quickly categorize the rustle as indicating a threat
or not indicating a threat. I do not need to know exactly what the
threat is, I only need to identify the category to which it belongs and
flee or stay, as appropriate. The need for quick categorization is
served by attending to only one characteristic. I might look toward
the rustle and ask if it was caused by an identifiably safe animal or not.
In other words, if I looked over and saw a mouse, I would categorize
the situation as safe. If I looked over and saw something bigger than a
mouse or could not see anything, I would run first and ask questions
later. I would let the one characteristic - identifiable safe animal -
represent the whole category of safe rustle. It makes sense, even
though it is clearly overinclusive and does not separate out all the safe
cases from the dangerous instances.
Seizing on a vivid, available detail and using it to quickly catego-
rize an event may be useful for making a flight or fight decision, but
may not be optimal for predicting the outcome of a legal matter. Yet
that is just what Mr. Worth is doing. He is using a vivid picture of one
bit of evidence he knows to categorize the whole larger body of evi-
dence with which he has little familiarity. The bag/box problem is not
typical of the whole mass of more reliable government evidence, but
Mr. Worth does not have information about that.
I have spoken to him about the government's evidence but it re-
mains a general idea for him. Although I can summon a vivid image
of the courtroom full of audio equipment, he cannot. I can describe
the binders full of transcripts and see us sitting at the defense table,
listening to the tapes being played and hearing the pages of the bind-
ers rustle as everyone flips through to follow along. Through those
details, I know and can better account for the evidence that will likely
convict him. For Mr. Worth, these are vague ideas which are impossi-
ble to compare against the one detailed thing he knows about the
case.
Unlike me, he has a strong image of that box. He knows, with a
vivid certainty, that it is not a bag. When he searches his mind to
evaluate the evidence, that box leaps to his conscious attention. The
box exemplifies the category of favorable evidence. It is harder for
82 See generally Gigerenzer, Todd, et al, Part III One Reason Decision Making. Al-
though this book does not use the nomenclature of representativeness, the section provides
an account of how simple problem solving strategies work.
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Mr. Worth to summon up competing examples and even more difficult
for him to figure out what the whole mass of evidence will look like
and how this one inconsistency fits into that larger picture. Mr.
Worth's strong commitment to the idea that the bag/box contradiction
is a major factor in his case reflects a deeply held feeling on his part.
He has analyzed this problem and reached a conclusion supported by
facts. He has used a method that has served him all his life. It should
not require much reflection to recognize that most of us frequently
feel strong commitment to ideas, memories and theories that later
turn out to be demonstrably wrong or tremendously ill considered.
Feeling right is a function of our current state of consciousness, which
is significantly influenced by rational factors, but is also subject to
other influences. Being right is a different sort of thing.
2. Egocentric Biases
The hardest thing we have trouble seeing as typical is ourselves.
The problem of representativeness is our tendency to think the excep-
tional things that stand out in our memory are common. The problem
of egocentric bias is our tendency to think many of our own common,
ordinary skills and experiences are exceptional. When we last left Mr.
Worth, he had also expressed his belief that the jury would not convict
him.
I had replied, "I'm not sure the jury will see it that way, but there
is still a lot we don't know about the evidence."
"I know," he responded, smiling, "But I know myself. People
like me. No jury will convict me. They don't convict people they like,
do they?"
"You're exactly right about that." I told him, "If someone likes
you, they believe you and they will try to think of reasons why you are
right. But we will have to think long and hard about how to let the
jury get to know you. A trial is very different from a social event and
even liking some people isn't enough to get over strong evidence."
"They'll like me." Mr. Worth said to himself, as much as to me,
"They won't convict me."
My client's view that his case would turn out better than other
similar cases was also familiar to me. I used to wonder why people
who had recently experienced a bad life event, getting arrested on se-
rious charges, persisted in the view that they were lucky. I was puz-
zled why they expected, in the absence of an identifiable reason, to
have a better result than other defendants. I have come to understand
this too as an example of a persistent, almost universal cognitive bias.
Most of my clients, like most everyone, experiences self-serving or
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egocentric biases. 83
Studies show that most people rate themselves as above average
drivers84 and above average at their jobs. 85 Even when people are
presented with data about rates of illness and rates of divorce, they
still view themselves as more likely to remain healthy than the popula-
tion at large and much more likely to remain happily married.8 6 Ego-
centric bias has an emotional component centering on self-image.
Optimism, self-confidence and a positive outlook on life are beneficial
and adaptive.8 7 But that emotional component has a cognitive, infor-
mation based component that can also lead us astray. When we
search our minds for information to reach or confirm a conclusion, we
have much more information about ourselves than we have about
other people.
If I am asked how big a contribution I made to a given project, I
can recall specific instances of work, the time I spent thinking about
some knotty problem and all the effort I put in to get the job accom-
plished. When I review how much work others contributed, I find that
I have little information about what they did outside of my presence.
As I compare my detailed record of what I did against the very sparse
evidence of their effort, I find I have evidence to support my view that
I have worked harder than others. We overestimate the percentage of
83 See Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 JNL. PER-
SONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCH. 806 (1980) (providing experimental data supporting hypoth-
esis that widely reported optimistic biases may be explained cognitively, rather than or in
addition to fulfilling a need to feel good about oneself); Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich,
supra note 27, at 811-13 (same).
84 Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers, 47
ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA, 143 (1981).
85 In a study of the impact of cognitive bias on magistrates, each was asked to rank
themselves by the number reversals on appeal. 56% placed themselves in the highest quar-
tile and 87% of the group expressed the view that half their peers were reversed more
often than they were. Only 4.5% put themselves in the highest quartile for reversal. 86
Cornell 777, 814. As the authors point out, the actual numbers may not distribute evenly
because some of the judges may never have been reversed, so more than 25% of the group
could be in the lowest reversal group (0 reversals). Even if that is true, the remainder of
the group is exhibiting egocentric bias. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 27 at
814.
86 Lyn Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Average: Percep-
tions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439
(1993) (reporting results of a study showing people about to marry held very high expecta-
tions for the longevity and happiness of the marriage after being presented with data about
high rates of divorce).
87 The absolute centrality of self-esteem to mental health has recently been the focus of
some useful and careful rethinking. See e.g., Roy F. Baumeister, Brad J. Bushman & W.
Keith Campbell, Self-esteem, Narcissism, and Aggression: Does Violence Result from Low
Self-esteem or from Threatened Egotism?, 9 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI-
ENCE 26-29 (2000).
[Vol. 9:783
Don't Believe Everything You Think
housework we do and the amount of time we speak at meetings. 88
When Mr. Worth thinks about how the jury will respond to him,
he draws on a selected data set about how people have responded to
him in the past. He supports his self-image as a likeable, lucky guy.
We have some information about our own internal states and know
little, if anything, about other people's inner lives. Yet, we make deci-
sions based on our understanding of what other people experience all
the time, as we must. Because we get along every day despite this
significant bias in our knowledge, it is hard for us to accept that this
mode of thinking may not work best in every situation. Even if Mr.
Worth has good data about probabilities, it will not help if he believes
that the averages only apply to other cases. People engage in all sorts
of high risk behavior and believe they will beat the odds.89 We pay
attention to the subset of information that tells us we are special be-
cause it is available to us and tells us what we want to know.
3. Affect and Information Processing
Other psychological factors are certainly at play as Mr. Worth
thinks about the length of a possible sentence, the bag and box and
the impression he would make on a jury. This gloomy picture moti-
vates him to pay attention to any ray of hope. His focus on the box/
bag inconsistency has an emotional component and that emotional
component also influences his decision making.90 Intuition might sug-
88 Michael Ross & Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 322 (1979) (finding that subjects overestimated how much
housework they did, how much they contributed to a group discussion, their importance to
the outcome of a basketball game and their contribution to a problem solving collabora-
tion). One mechanism underlying the egocentric bias is the tendency to use the informa-
tion most readily available to our minds. This is called the availability heuristic. Two things
that effect availability of information are the volume of the information we have and where
it is stored in our minds. Our fund of available information about the world is also strongly
biased in favor of information about ourselves and against information about others. We
have a lot of information about ourselves and our experiences in the world, some informa-
tion about the small circle of people we know well and almost no information about the
vast majority of people and situations with which we have no personal experience. To the
extent we have read or heard about other people and places, that information tends to be
less vivid and it does not come close to making up the difference. We simply have much
more information about ourselves than about other people.
We also use and access information about ourselves more frequently and thus have it
more available. For example, we may have information relevant to a decision we are mak-
ing in both short and long term memory. The information in short term memory is more
readily accessible.
89 Smoking and the lottery are two prominent examples. Egocentric bias is also adap-
tive in many contexts, but we must try to separate out its positive role in maintaining a
healthy, optimistic outlook from its tendency to distort the information upon which we
may base important decisions.
90 1 have represented clients so overwhelmed by their situation that they became clini-
cally depressed. Situations of mental pathology are beyond the scope of this discussion. I
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gest that he would focus on the one good fact and avoid the undesir-
able facts.
Research suggests a more complex picture.
Experimental subjects who have no particular motivation beyond
the instructions of the experimenter will avoid unpleasant or negative
subjects. But people who believe they have a long term interest in
dealing with a difficult topic will pay attention to unpleasant informa-
tion. Moderate stress associated with a serious problem will also help
people focus on the problem at hand.91 The unpleasant topic can be a
negative factor but should not make it impossible for most people to
think about the evidence against them.
It is also important to distinguish between the lawyer's emotional
tone at the meeting and the emotional content of the subject under
discussion. Although criminal defense lawyers often talk about very
unpleasant subjects with their clients, they need not be unpleasant
during those discussions. We do a better job analyzing both pleasant
and unpleasant information when we are in a better mood. Problem
solving tends to be more flexible and sustained when the solvers have
a positive affect. 92
Thus, inducing a better mood at the time of the discussion will
improve the quality of the decision making and mitigate avoidance or
denial. Lawyers can enhance recall and encourage broader and more
creative categorizations and connections among ideas if they can es-
tablish a pleasant atmosphere. On the other hand, negative affect at
the time of the discussion, induced in part by the difficult situation at
hand, will tend to make decision making and problem solving more
rigid and less informed. There are distinct cognitive mechanisms, in-
fluenced by the emotional content of the situation but not simply re-
ducible to anxiety or avoidance behavior. Mr. Worth may be
motivated by his desire to emotionally escape his difficult situation by
ignoring it, but that emotional content induces a cognitive response
and can be mitigated by skillful counseling. Rapport and atmosphere
matter. Smiling at clients, expressing concern for and trying to make
have also represented people who refused to discuss their situation because they found it
so unpleasant. That too is distinct from the client whose information processing and deci-
sion making is affected but not overridden by emotional issues.
91 Moderate stress enhances concentration and high stress, or the complete absence of
stress, tends to decrease concentration and task performance. See ELIZABETH LoFrus &
JAMES DOYLE, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION § 2.14 (1987) (explaining the Yerkes-Dodson
curve).
92 Alice M. Isen, Positive Affect and Decision Making, 424-429 in MICHAEL LEWIS &
JEANEl-rE M. HAVILAND-JONES, HANDBOOK OF EMOnONS (2000) (collecting and summa-
rizing research suggesting that positive affect increases recall and enhances creative catego-
rization, improving both problem solving and decision making involving both positive and
negative materials).
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them smile will make them better problem solvers. 93
III. RESPONDING TO COGNITIVE BIASES
So far, the picture is a tad bleak. Representativeness and egocen-
tric biases have led Mr. Worth to focus on one tree instead of the
whole forest and to think that bad things are more likely to happen to
other people than to him. His lawyer may have delayed the impact of
framing and hindsight bias by waiting to provide some important in-
formation, but that is not a positive program. How can a lawyer and
client respond to cognitive illusion?
Patience should be the first line of defense. Both lawyer and cli-
ent will learn more, and think more, as the case progresses. Mr.
Worth has suffered a terrible blow. Although the box/bag distinction
may always be a significant image to him, experience tells me it is
likely to recede in importance over time., If it does not, it can be more
effectively challenged when the lawyer client relationship is better de-
veloped, the facts are clearer and a decision needs to be made. Mr.
Worth should be permitted the time and space to think these matters
through for himself and arrive at a considered view of his situation.94
There are also a variety of strategies, in addition to patience, that
can help lawyers reduce the impact of cognitive biases on their clients
and themselves. Research suggests that lawyers can be particularly
helpful in identifying and correcting framing biases. We can also re-
spond to some problems that stem from ego-centric, representative-
ness and hindsight biases.
93 Individual differences among clients, and lawyers, are another relevant factor. Re-
search suggests that people with higher levels of educational achievement and those who
score well on traditional intelligence tests tend to be less prone to cognitive error. Tradi-
tional education encourages abstract and structured analysis, which tends to attenuate
bias, particularly framing problems. Individual differences in education or capacity for
abstract reasoning, do not, however, explain all, or even most of the problem. Stanovich &
West, supra note 23 at 645 (concluding that while intelligence, problem definition and con-
textual factors all give rise to performance errors, a significant gap remains between the
normatively predicted rational result and the actual descriptive result which can best be
explained by a pervasive and systematic element of irrationality or cognitive bias).
94 Time and patience are two things many public defenders cannot give their clients.
More than 50% of the federal inmates interviewed for a study of criminal defense lawyers
reported that they had talked with their appointed lawyers three times or less while the
case was pending. Caroline Wolf Harlow, United States Department of Justice, Office of
Justice Programs Special Reports, Defense Counsel in Criminal Cases at Table 17 (2000)
(showing that 54% of the federal inmates reported talking with appointed counsel three
times or less, 23% reported four to five conversations and 22% said they had talked six or
more times). There are a myriad of ways our grossly overburdened public defenders are
hindered in their efforts to meet high standards. The role of cognitive illusion and heuris-
tics in rapid decision making makes limited discussions about how serious cases particu-
larly problematic.
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A. Overcoming Framing Biases
Mr. Worth and I had our third meeting. After our last conversa-
tion I had called the prosecutor and chatted about the case. Although
it was an early, tentative discussion, the prosecutor let me know that
he would meet with Mr. Worth for a proffer session 95 and consider
cooperation. The prosecutor also suggested that he would offer a plea
agreement that would mitigate the impact of the ten year mandatory
minimum sentence with the safety valve provision. 96 The sentencing
range under that deal would be 70-87 months. 97 Both the plea sug-
gestion and the interest in cooperation reflect the standard practices
of that office for a narcotics case of this scope. Although I had some
vague ideas about more aggressive positions on a few guidelines is-
sues, they did not seem all that strong and it was too early in the case
to float them to my adversary.
I began to describe my conversation with the prosecutor to Mr.
Worth. Explaining that it was still very early in the case and all this
was very tentative, I went on to say that the prosecutor said he
thought he would offer a plea in line with his office's usual practice.
"It's still early," I repeated, "so things can change, but a plea of-
fer would give us a good chance of a sentence range of 70-87 months.
That would mean the sentence could not be less than 70 months or
more than 87 months. We might also be able to argue for a lower
guideline range, but some judges might be inclined to impose a
slightly longer sentence. You have to keep in mind, without a deal
there is a ten year mandatory minimum and a potential for a sentence
longer than ten years."
"That is too much time," Mr. Worth exclaimed. "Damn, that is
too much time."
"I think these narcotics sentences are crazy," I replied. "But
that's the law and we have to deal with it."
"It is just too much time," Mr. Worth repeated.
Although many narcotics sentences are too long, Mr. Worth's im-
mediate reaction may not help him make a decision. Perhaps he is
inclined to reject the plea offer because it involves too long a prison
sentence. If so, the important question is comparative - against what
95 A proffer session is a meeting between the defendant and the prosecutor during
which the defendant tells the government everything he or she knows about any and all
criminal activity in return for the government's promise of limited use immunity and con-
sideration of a cooperation deal. The government controls the terms of a proffer session
and makes no promise that cooperation will be accepted. See generally, Weinstein, supra
note 59 at 584-91 (describing how the government dictates the terms of the cooperation
negotiation and allocates all risk to the defendant).
96 See supra note 68.
97 Id.
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measure is the sentence too long? Seen in this light, Mr. Worth's com-
ment suggest a framing problem. The sentence may be too long if he
was thinking he would only serve a year in prison, but it may not be
too long compared to a fifteen year sentence after trial.
When Mr. Worth commented that the plea offer would involve
too long a prison sentence, I sympathized with his view and then said,
"that's the law and we have to deal with it." Although my comment
was neither clear, nor profound, I was staking out space for the idea
that evaluating potential sentences required careful attention to fram-
ing. This was no great insight on my part. I have had this discussion
before and data suggest that lawyers tend to be better than non-law-
yers at identifying and overcoming framing bias98 when they evaluate
legal matters. 99
For illustration of how lawyers and non-lawyers respond to fram-
ing bias, we return to the car accident hypothetical discussed above. 100
In that experiment, subjects were put in the role of litigants in a car
accident case to whom a settlement had been extended. They were
divided into two groups, one in which the settlement could be framed
as a gain and the other in which it could be framed as a loss. Although
both groups were offered economically equivalent settlement pack-
ages, some litigants were told they had been driving a Toyota, while
others had been driving a BMW. The settlement was adequate to per-
mit the hypothetical Toyota drivers to purchase an equivalent replace-
ment car, but was not enough for the hypothetical BMW drivers to
replace that more expensive car. Thus, the Toyota drivers could see
the settlement as a gain while the BMW drivers could see it as a loss,
even though the settlement offers were equivalent. The researchers
presented this pair of hypothetical to students and lawyers. While the
lawyers in the study showed almost no difference in their evaluation
of the two offers, settling at very similar rates regardless of whether
they were in the Toyota or BMW group, the students were more likely
to settle when they were gainers. The lawyers seem to have seen past
the framing and recognized that the two offers were economically
98 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 27, at 822 (arguing that judges are well
suited to reframing decisions to arrive at better anchors); Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note
24, at 107 (collecting studies suggesting lawyers may be able to respond to framing bias).
99 The core framing problem is identifying the correct comparison point of relative util-
ity on the same metric- comparing the dollar value of a settlement and the dollar value of a
trial or the total time spent taking the bus compared to the time it would take to walk. It
can often be addressed, if it can be identified. More general anchoring or framing
problems - how to frame an argument, and problems that involve comparing different
kinds of goods, time and money or fairness and money - may be easier to spot but usually
do not have clear answers.
100 See supra, pp. 20-22.
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identical. 101
Other data are consistent with the result suggesting that lawyers
are less sensitive to framing bias. A study of United States Magis-
trates showed they were relatively less sensitive to framing biases than
other cognitive biases.'0 2 Many lawyers and judges have learned to
think about and analyze expected value. They tend to share the in-
strumentalism of the legal culture which encourages this kind of anal-
ysis. Their repeated exposure to problems of this sort10 3 also helps
them develop the habit of analyzing these problems in economic
terms. Finally, the role of adviser encourages careful and apparently
objective analysis of a settlement offer.' 0 4 Lawyerly habits of careful,
objective reasoning help us spot and respond to framing biases. Law-
yers should develop a range of analytic tools10 5 and be taught to look
101 The students who were in the Toyota group settled at a statistically significant higher
rate than the students in the BMW group, while the lawyers in each group were statistically
indistinguishable from each other. Moreover, the interaction between the subject pools
and the condition was statistically significant, suggesting the difference between the groups
was not coincidental. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 24, at 100-101. The students were
Stanford undergraduates. The lawyers in the study were a group of large firm attorneys,
primarily engaged in civil practices representing institutional clients. The litigators among
them tended to represent civil defendants.
102 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 27.
103 Repeat players often have a strong incentive to figure out and account for their bi-
ases. Some suggest this limits the reach of the cognitive bias literature in explaining eco-
nomic behavior. This argument has special force for professionals in financial markets.
Some have pointed to the persistence of asset pricing errors as evidence of the persistence
of bias in that setting, Conlisk, supra note 20, at 673. Efficient market theorists suggest
other explanations. For a discussion of the current debate about the impact of behavioral
economics on the efficient market hypothesis and citations to current efficiency advocates
see, Donald Lagnevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral
Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 135, 136-37 (2202)(noting that behav-
ioral economics has made significant inroads but there remain many vigorous defenders of
efficiency).
Whether or not repeat players correct for bias in financial markets, it seems less likely
that repeat players eliminate this problem in lawyering. Players have to be aware of, and
motivated to respond to bias before they can benefit from repeated exposure to the prob-
lem. Lawyers in practices that expose them to economic analysis and data driven decision
making are more likely to begin to account for cognitive bias than other lawyers. Criminal
defense lawyers may not be as attuned to, or as motivated to respond as some others.
Most federal narcotics defendants are not repeat players in arenas that would educate
them about cognitive bias. Whether or not cognitive bias should limit the reach of the
efficient markets hypothesis, a question much beyond this paper, it should be considered in
client counseling.
104 For more on debiasing, see, infra pp. 51-54.
105 For an interesting approach to teaching Beysian reasoning, see Peter Sedlmeier,
Gerd Gigerenzer, Teaching Bayesian Reasoning in Less Than Two Hours 130 JOURNAL OF
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: GENERAL 380 (2001) (reporting that teaching Bayesian
probability using frequency representations instead of rules resulted in much better imme-
diate learning and retention over time and theorizing that the results support an ecological
view of rationality in which some information representations simply fit better with the
way our minds have evolved).
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at situations from a variety of perspectives and make conscious
choices about the proper comparison point for a given decision. 0 6
In addition to spotting framing issues, lawyers must help their cli-
ents identify and overcome their framing problems. On this question,
Korobkin and Guthrie offer a provocative finding. They offer some
evidence that counseling relying upon assertions of authority are more
effective in countering framing bias than counseling techniques that
try to educate the client to make better decisions. It also appears that
some counseling techniques influence framing issues that arise from
non-economic concerns, but framing biases involving economic issues
are more-resistant to counseling.
The part of the study addressing counseling techniques used two
hypotheticals to evaluate four different approaches lawyers might
take in addressing framing biases. The first hypothetical was the
Toyota/BMW problem discussed above. As noted, in the car accident
hypothetical the scenarios differed so that economically equivalent of-
fers were presented as an apparent gain to one group and an apparent
loss to the second group. The second problem involved a landlord
tenant dispute. In the landlord tenant hypotheticals, equivalent set-
tlements were offered by two different landlords, one of whom was
presented as sympathetic, the other as blameworthy. In both varia-
tions, the tenant went four months without heat in his or her apart-
ment, despite repeated calls to the landlord. In one variation the
subject was told that the landlord was unable to fix the heater because
he was out of the country on a family emergency. In the other varia-
tion, the subject was told that the landlord failed to return numerous
phone calls and no explanation was offered. 10 7 This set of hypotheti-
cals tests the impact of non-economic benchmarks (fault or blame) on
decision making.
Each subject' 018 received one of the factual scenarios described
above and one of four different written versions of their lawyer's ad-
vice109 about the settlement offer. Each was asked to consider the
106 Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching Professional Judgment, 69 WASH. L. REV.
527, 553-54 (1994) (urging law schools to teach about the psychology of decision making).
107 Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 24, at 108-11.
108 The subjects were 149 Stanford undergraduates, none of whom had participated in
any other aspect of the study. Id. at 114.
109 The first version of lawyerly advice is titled "the psychology lesson." The advice ex-
plains framing bias in a mini social science lesson and urges clients to be aware of this
tendency. The second version is "consider the opposite," in which the advice takes the
form of explaining to the client that while the lawyer knows the client may see the settle-
ment as a loss, it is also true that the client would be better off with the settlement as
compared to the client's current position and it will avoid the risk of litigation. This ap-
proach offers the client a different perspective, without explaining cognitive bias. Each of
these first two approaches are intended as educational and value neutral. The third and
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facts and their lawyer's advice before deciding whether or not to ac-
cept the settlement offer. The authors compared settlements rates be-
tween those who received advice from a lawyer and those who did not
and among the different styles of advice. The study found differences
related to both the kind of advice that was offered and the nature of
the framing bias. Overall, the simple assertion of authority by the
lawyer, an unadorned recommendation to accept the offer, had the
biggest impact in encouraging settlement,110 and the advice was much
more potent when the issue was fault, as in the landlord tenant prob-
lem, than economic loss or gain, as in the Toyota/BMW problem.
The suggestion that advice alone, without explanation, is more
potent in overcoming bias is broadly consistent with other studies on
"debiasing," or overcoming cognitive illusions. Other work suggests
that teaching about bias is less effective than training people to ana-
lyze problems differently or appealing to experts."' This part of the
study offers the useful suggestion that we should avoid trying to ex-
plain cognitive bias to our clients. Instead, we should analyze the
problem with them, leading them through a step by step discussion of
the different benchmarks they might use and which one is correct in
the particular situation. The role of assertions of authority in counsel-
ing is more problematic, but the research suggests another reason why
the client centered reluctance to give advice may not be appropriate in
every situation.
The results also showed that while advice increased the rate of
settlement in the landlord tenant problem to a statistically significant
degree, it generated a statistically insignificant rise in settlement in
the car accident problem. The landlord tenant problem presented a
difference in apparent fairness; in one version the offending landlord
fourth options include explicit recommendations, or advice giving. Variation three offers
the expected value calculation with a recommendation to settle. Variation four is an
unadorned recommendation to settle. All the variations included a reminder that the cli-
ent had full authority to act as he or she chose. Id. at 115-19.
110 The most effective approach was a recommendation alone, without any explanation.
The authors suggest that the litigants may be swayed by authority and accept it because
they have no means of evaluating the underlying merits. The next most effective approach
was the "psychology lesson," followed by "recommendation with calculation" and "con-
sider the alternatives." Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 24, at 115-22.
111 A 1982 study summarizing the results of 40 studies on overcoming hindsight bias and
overconfidence suggests that clarifying or otherwise changing the task, and merely warning
of the problem, have little impact. The methods that showed significant improvements in
overconfidence were describing the problem, personalized feedback, extensive training,
searching for conflicting information and relying on experts. Responding to hindsight bias
has not been the subject of as much study. Searching for conflicting information is th only
method that showed significant results. Baruch Fischoff, Debiasing, in KAHNEMAN ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 422. Fischoff's categories offer close analogy, with reliance on experts
standing in for the pure advice model. Conlisk, supra note 20, at 671.
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was sympathetic, in the other he was not. It appears that the advice
worked to debias people who undervauled a settlement because they
started out thinking it did not compensate for unfairness. Subjects in
this group were more likely to come to see that whether the landlord
was nice or not, the compensation offered was a reasonable choice,
given the alternatives.
Puzzlingly, advice did not have the same impact on people con-
sidering the monetary comparison offered to the BMW/Toyota group.
The authors suggest that framing at play in the car hypothetical is
more persistent than the "socially constructed" desire for vindication
or equity. In some respects, the suggestion that equity seeking is more
subject to lawyer influence than wealth maximization may seem both
dangerous and counterintuitive. A desire for fairness or vindication is
just the sort of normative judgment that many think can, and should,
override purely economic concerns. Purely economic issues, on the
other hand, can be judged according to the best numbers. 112 Then
again, perhaps that simple dichotomy leaves out far too much.
Perhaps the subjects in the car accident problem valued driving a
BMW so much that they preferred to risk a trial because it offered the
only possibility of replacing that car. Some people might not be satis-
fied with any result that did not put them back in a BMW. Korobkin
and Guthrie note that lawyers must distinguish between the cases in
which the client understands the implications of their choice and
chooses some other good and the situations in which the client misap-
prehends the relative payoffs of the choices.
They also recognize that when the client's analysis seems incor-
rect, the lawyer faces a hard choice about whether to try to correct the
reasoning through education or simply achieve the best result by giv-
ing advice. At bottom, we cannot make clear cut choices. It is rarely
clear whether or not the client is acting on bad information or value
preferences. Even when it is, it may be possible to overbear the
choice but much harder, or impossible, to rectify the information
error.
The uncertainty about the client's underlying motivation and
value choice can be all the more confusing when the lawyer is not
clear if he is imposing his own framing bias. When Mr. Worth said the
sentence was too long, I understood him to be saying it was too long
compared to some other sentence he might receive. I think the deci-
sion about whether or not to accept a deal most often turns on the
112 The more decontextualized and abstract the analysis, the less likely it is to suffer
from cognitive bias. Stanovich & West, supra note 23, at 658-60. The appropriateness of
decontextualized and abstract analysis of any particular lawyering problem is often a diffi-
cult normative question.
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length of the sentence. In cases that turn on the relative severity of
the punishment, it is important to make sure that the client under-
stands and makes comparisons among the available options. One dif-
ficult problems is uncovering any undisclosed framing problems. This
requires careful, detailed interviewing. A second problem is discount-
ing for uncertainty in a helpful way. Does a client think that a 30%
chance of a ten year jail sentence is the same as the certainty of a
three year jail sentence? This issue must be carefully presented.
Some clients, however, do not have sentence minimization as
their primary goal. For example, Mr. Worth might think that a crimi-
nal case is about justice. Perhaps he is saying that the sentence is sim-
ply excessive and therefore wrong. He might even hold the view that
he should not accept an unjust sentence, even if a longer sentence
would be imposed after a trial. I have represented people who did not
think that getting the lowest possible sentence was worth any price,
but it took me a long time to realize that.
The story of another client illustrates the problem of the lawyer
confusing cognitive illusion and value choices. It is a story of how I
came to understand that what I thought was my client's framing bias
turned out to be my own framing problem. Mr. Reade 13 was
nineteen and lived in Staten Island with his girlfriend and their young
son. He was a sweet, handsome and somewhat unsophisticated per-
son whose childhood friend had a heroin connection. Unfortunately,
his friend found a buyer who was an undercover agent. Mr. Reade
was arrested at the conclusion of the transaction but the circumstances
proved nothing more than his presence at the scene. In short, the evi-
dence against him was not strong, except for the rather lengthy incul-
patory statement he had made following his arrest. He faced a five
year mandatory minimum sentence upon conviction.
Mr. Reade was released on bail. He chose to go to trial, despite
my efforts to persuade him to cooperate against his friend and cut his
losses. Mr. Reade told me he could not turn on his friend. Although I
could not feel the pull of his loyalty to the person who brought him
into this situation, I reluctantly respected the choice. Of course there
was nothing I could do if he refused to plead guilty. I was more troub-
led when his co-defendant failed to appear in court shortly before
trial, literally leaving Mr. Reade holding the bag. Mr. Reade was con-
victed and sentenced to the mandatory minimum five years in prison
by a wise judge who expressed his regret at imposing the harsh sen-
tence the law required.
113 Mr. Reade is based upon a particular client I represented about a dozen years ago.
Identifying details have been altered, but the case is as accurately described as my memory
permits.
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I often thought of Mr. Reade and sometimes talked with students
about the counseling problem the case presented. As I saw it, he had
chosen a path that led to a harsher punishment than he should have
faced, both normatively and descriptively. Harsh sentences for people
like Mr. Reade are wrong. He had the option of cooperating against
another, more culpable person who was almost certain to be convicted
no matter what Mr. Reade did. I wondered if I should have pushed
him harder to reconsider his decision not to cooperate with the
government.
This story illustrates the pervasive problem of framing, although
I only saw my own framing problem after I presented a draft of this
paper at a workshop. Although I have claimed to be a client centered,
creative problem solving lawyer, I have long seen this case in the nar-
rowest and most lawyer centered light. I used to think Mr. Reade
made a bad choice because he did not minimize his sentence. But a
colleague suggested that Mr. Reade is a man who chose a principle
over his own self interest. I may not value Mr. Reade's loyalty, but
Mr. Reade thought it a virtue worth a significant price. My own nar-
row framing of the problem is all the more glaring because I have
written about the evils of pressuring defendants into disloyalty by en-
couraging snitching through harsh penalties.' 14 Events gave me the
evidence that I was wrong to think about sentence length to the exclu-
sion of everything else, but the dawn came slowly.
About three and a half or four years after Mr. Reade's trial, I was
coming out of the MCC when I saw a familiar face. There was Mr.
Reade, wearing prison khakis and mopping the entry hall of the jail.
He gave me a big smile. I went right over to say hello.
"Hi, how are you?" I asked, grinning from ear to ear, happy to
see a face from the past.
"I'm OK," he said, "be in a halfway house in a couple of months
maybe."
Then he went right to the heart of the matter and answered the
question I wanted to ask, but would not have dared to put to him. "I
did the right thing. This wasn't so bad. I could not have lived with
myself if I hadn't gone to trial. I grew up while I was in. I know I'm
going to take care of my family when I get out. The baby is getting
big. I did the right thing." He assured me.
"I'm so glad you're well and almost out. It's so good to see you.
Take care. Good luck." I said, as I headed for the street. After long
reflection, I have come to believe Mr. Reade knew something more
about what he wanted than I did when I represented him.
114 Weinstein, supra note 59, at 621-25 (criticizing the government's encouraging the
immoral act of disloyalty through the overuse of cooperation).
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B. Responding to the Representativeness Bias
Mr. Worth's focus on the mistaken assertion that a bag, rather
than a box, was taken from him is an example of the representative-
ness bias. This tendency to give undue weight to salient but rare
events appears harder to control than framing bias. Some data sug-
gest that even trained professionals, making decisions within their ex-
pertise, are effected by the bias. 115 Though it is a challenge, we must
be alert to situations that pose representativeness problems and ad-
dress them. Mr. Worth's situation justifies the effort. The stakes are
high and the decisions turn upon predictions about future events that
are prone to representativeness bias.
We can fight the tendency to fall prey to the bias by seeking out
and using the best baseline information available.11 6 Litigators often
make claims that a certain type of case typically comes out in a partic-
ular way. We depend those judgments when making predictions
about the likely result of a contested case. When important interests
are at stake, we must ask ourselves how many of these cases can we
identify and how typical are they. Knowing we are prone to basing
predictions on unusual, if easily recalled examples, we should be espe-
cially cautious about that style of decision making. We must also mis-
trust predictions that rely upon or suggest very rare events. They can
feel entirely right, but rare events are rare for a reason. They just
don't happen often. Lawyers and law students need to study decision
making1 7 and probability theory.
More familiarity with concepts of statistical proof would address
the narrower, prediction oriented aspect of the representativeness
problem. There is, however, another, broader aspect of representa-
tiveness that may suggest an approach to Mr. Worth's situation. Rep-
resentativeness understood as the peculiar power of the salient detail,
is at the core of persuasion.11 8 Perhaps it is a problem well suited to a
115 Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 24, at note 41.
116 There may be some suspicion about obtaining good baseline information for many
legal decisions. The law celebrates the uniqueness of each set of facts and much of the skill
for which clients' pay is a lawyer's judgment about a particular case in a particular jurisdic-
tion. But the profession appears to have a strong economic disincentive to taking a more
structured approach to decision making or even sharing good data about cases. Where
would we be if we found out that relatively few factors could accurately predict the out-
come of a litigated case across many jurisdictions? Whatever the answer to that question,
it is currently hard to get good baseline information in a number of areas.
117 For a discussion of decision theory and its application to lawyering decisions, see
McDiarmid, supra note 76 (analyzing and critiquing decision theory, inductive probability
and causal thinking and arguing that each is appropriate to a particular class of decisions
yet none yields perfect predictions).
118 And its related cousin, the vividness effect. Vividness refers to how detailed or imag-
inable a given scenario is and some research suggests vivid information can influence deci-
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lawyerly solution.
People are prone to the representativeness bias because some ex-
amples are perceived as more powerful exemplars of their category
than logic would support. Good advocates have long understood the
importance of finding the right example. Some details bind tightly to
their general category whether or not they should. A red convertible
is strongly associated with the male mid life crisis, whatever the state
of the statistics for relevant car buyers. Given the power of the detail
to capture and define a larger category, perhaps one approach to rep-
resentativeness problems is to meet ill chosen persuasive details with
better selected persuasive details.
When Mr. Worth talks about the mistake in the complaint and
the confusion between the bag and the box, we should understand him
as captured by that particular detail. When he summons up the cate-
gory of evidence in the case against him, that bag and box keep com-
ing into focus. If we think those details are not typical, we might try to
offer some other details that are more typical and stand a chance of
replacing the bag and box. Let us return to the conversation with Mr.
Worth. Once again we are at our third meeting together and he raises
the issue of the box and bag. The discussion starts with Mr. Worth
saying the same thing, but suppose I try a different approach:
"They took a bag from me, but it says it was a box," Mr. Worth
repeated. "They have no case against me, no jury will send me away."
"I will argue that," I assured him, perhaps sounding a little frus-
trated, "and let's say we win on the box argument and they are con-
vinced the complaint was wrong about that. Let's think about what is
in the bag. How was the cocaine packaged?"
"It was in one kilo bricks," he explained.
"Tell me about them, what were they wrapped in?" I prompted.
"Well, they were in plastic and wrapped in tape," he answered.
"What color was the tape? What did they look like? Could you
see any of the bricks?" I asked.
"The tape was around the short side and you could see something
under there, in between the strips of tape," he said.
I explained, "The cocaine will be in the courtroom. The prosecu-
tors wheel around these metal carts with their files and evidence, you
know to get from their office to the courtroom. They will put the coke
into evidence and then it will sit out there during the trial, for the jury
to see. When they deliberate, they will have seen and heard about the
bag, the complaint and the bricks of cocaine. I think they will be
thinking about the cocaine. What do you think?"
sions more than pallid information. PLOUS, supra note 27, at 125.
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"Maybe I'll be thinking about the bag and they'll be thinking
about the cocaine." Mr. Worth suggested.
The idea is to replace the details that currently define the cate-
gory of trial evidence for Mr. Worth with different details that 1, as the
lawyer, believe will result in a more accurate characterization of the
evidence. Mr. Worth has been viewing the relevant category as evi-
dence insufficient to convict. I think he might better view it as evi-
dence sufficient to convict. This strategy adds another kind of option
to the four suggested by Korobkin and Guthrie. In addition to telling
the client about the heuristic, urging the client to consider other de-
tails, telling the client what outcome the lawyer recommends with an
explanation of the error in reasoning, and simply telling the client
what outcome the lawyer recommends, this fifth strategy attempts to
use the heuristic.
Some may think a direct discussion of the heuristic is more re-
spectful of the client. Using the heuristic may seem manipulative,
akin to using persuasion and hiding our actual reasons and ideas. But
cognitive science urges us to consider how we process information, not
just what information is provided. What we tell our clients matters
much less than what they understand and conclude from the informa-
tion they actually attend to and process.' 1 9
Counseling requires lawyers to give information and to help cli-
ents use it, or process it, effectively, while leaving room for the client
to act on his or her own values. Korobkin and Guthrie, like others,
sensibly argue that client decisions based upon cognitive errors should
be probed and questioned while those that turn on value choices
should generally be respected. They also discuss how little that for-
mulation really tells us. The problem only grows worse as we consider
approaches to egocentric and hindsight biases.
C. Addressing Egocentric Bias
Egocentric bias presents yet another difficulty and may be espe-
cially difficult for lawyers. In its broader form, this bias has a signifi-
cant emotional or motivational component which serves clients and
the profession well. Self confidence is an important attribute of an
advocate, and more generally, for any lawyer. Obviously, an advocate
must be careful not to let an inflated ego propel him or her to assure a
client that an acquittal is certain in the face of overwhelming evidence,
but that is not, at base, a problem of tricky, unconscious bias. Bad
119 See generally Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1,
30 (1988) ("Lawyers who say they just provide technical input and lay out the options
while leaving the decisions and methods of implementing them up to their clients are kid-
ding themselves...").
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judgment and narcissism are separate matters.
Suppose we return to Mr. Worth and he tells us that he wants to
go to trial because he believes he will win the trial, although he knows
his lawyer has a different estimate of the chances. Egocentric bias, on
the part of both lawyer and client, make this a dangerous situation.
Too many lawyers, myself included, have been sorely tempted to ac-
cept an early decision 20 to go to trial. After all, it is his Sixth Amend-
ment right. Most of us became trial lawyers because we wanted to try
cases. It can be very satisfying to stride into the courtroom and de-
mand an early trial date. Lawyer and client are both quite happy with
their unrealistic, but strong expectation of success. Their happiness
may not last, but if they are proven wrong, it will be too late.
Understanding the cognitive tendency to display overconfidence
may only give another name to what many already understand as a
general human tendency. It may also suggest some additional strate-
gies for dealing with the problem. To the extent our greater access to
information about ourselves is a contributing factor, lawyers might try
to address that problem. We should probe Mr. Worth's belief that he
will win. The simple assertion, "I am lucky," must be unpacked. I
have had conversations like this with clients who predictably recalled
a spectacular gambling win, or some close call in an accident. Al-
though the studies warn us that the bias is fairly resistant to informa-
tion, the best strategies appear to be highlighting discordant
information and offering feedback about the reasoning. 121
Here is the conversation with Mr. Worth:
"I know you said the jury is likely to convict on this evidence, but
I just don't think they will convict me," Mr. Worth commented.
"Why do you think that?" I asked.
"I'm lucky. I've always been lucky. I won $1000 in the lottery."
He observed.
"That's a lot more than the $100 1 won at supermarket bingo, but
you weren't very lucky in this case. Out of all the people involved in
all kinds of things, you got arrested." I answered.
"Well, that wasn't a great day for me, but I still don't think the
jury will convict me." He answered.
"Did you think you were going to get arrested? Do you think
most people expect the bad things that happen to them?" I asked.
120 The desire to commit oneself far in advance may also be a strategy for overcoming
another bias, the tendency to overestimate our ability to make a hard decision in the
moment.
121 Fischoff, supra note 26. It can be very challenging to offer individualized feedback
without making the client feel judged or criticized. This particular ounseling requires that
the attorney and client have developed good rapport and that the attorney have command
over his or her counseling technique. Affect can be dispositive at moments like this.
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"I see your point," he said softly, "but I am not sure I want to
plead guilty."
"That is a different thing." I answered.
If we recognize that a decision to take a very high risk with the
expectation of being lucky may be fed by cognitive illusion, we may be
prepared to take a more searching, assertive approach, but it can be
one of the riskiest moments in the lawyer client relationship. If we
have been successful in developing a strong relationship with the cli-
ent, this may well be the moment we test just how much trust has
developed between us, because this is a moment in which we chal-
lenge an emotionally loaded bit of the client's reasoning. In the dia-
log I have presented, Mr. Worth accepted my observation, but this is
also a moment at which many clients will understandably bristle. Al-
though it is a difficult and perhaps dangerous moment, it is also a very
important moment in the attorney client relationship. Whether we
help our client overcome an irrational belief that could lead to a bad
decision or we discover that there is a value choice underneath the
assertion of luck, we have done a very important and helpful thing for
our client and our lawyering.
D. Mr. Worth's Decision and How Hindsight Bias Makes it so
Difficult to Evaluate the Outcome
I talked with Mr. Worth for about an hour that day at the MCC.
In addition to the snippets of conversation offered here, we discussed
many of the details of pleas, cooperation and trials. Four days later
Mr. Worth called and asked me when I could visit him again. He said
he had been thinking a lot and talking to some of the other inmates. I
went to the MCC two days later.
I went upstairs and met Mr. Worth. After a quick hello, he said
that he wanted to offer his cooperation to the government. He
quickly turned the conversation to the probable outcome of the trial.
"Nobody wins, I have talked to some guys here and that is what
everyone says." He observed.
"Some people win trials," I responded. "It depends on the case.
But a drug case where they have tapes and the drugs, that's tough. I
have already told you, I can't say you would definitely be convicted,
but it seems very, very likely to me."
We talked more about what would happen at a trial, but Mr.
Worth was just confirming what he had already decided he knew. The
conversation soon turned to the mechanics of cooperation. We dis-
cussed how Mr. Worth could try to make the prosecutor and agents
believe and like him. That afternoon I called the prosecutor and set
up a meeting. Mr. Worth succeeded. He established a solid working
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relationship with the government, testified at the trial of a defendant
he had set up through a phone call and offered information about
others. His cooperation was judged successful by the government and
he received the coveted 5K1.1 letter 122 from the government.
Twenty two months after his arrest, Mr. Worth was sentenced to
time served. After the sentence was imposed, his brother and I went
to the cellblock to await his release. I buzzed the deputy marshal and
we talked over the intercom system. A few moments later that big
metal door opened and the deputy took the change of clothes Mr.
Worth's brother had brought for him. After about an hour, when the
warrant check had cleared, we heard the lock clang. The door opened
and out came Mr. Worth. He hugged his brother and shook my hand.
With a big smile, he said, "I am so glad to be out. I knew this was the
best thing to do."
"I am so glad this worked out. Until the judge said it, I just
wasn't sure you were walking out today." I remarked.
"I knew I was walking out today." Mr. Worth responded.
"Let's not stand around here." I suggested and started toward the
elevator. We rode down to the lobby and as we walked to the front
door, I reminded Mr. Worth to call the probation department today
and set up an appointment. The three of us walked out of the court-
house and down the steps. I stopped on the sidewalk and put out my
hand. Mr. Worth and I shook hands again. I shook hands with his
brother and wished them good luck. Mr. Worth smiled and he and his
brother walked down the block to the subway. I felt I had done a
good day's work but how is one to know?
Mr. Worth made a reasonable choice, but it is still quite difficult
to evaluate whether it was the best choice. In retrospect, things take
on a cast of inevitability. We are cognitively wired to see contingent,
random events falling into a pattern because we tend to update our
memories with later acquired information. We believe that we knew
all along things we did not in fact know until later. This is hindsight
bias. Hindsight bias infects judgments about our relationship to past
events. Although it is usually analyzed as a problem for decisions that
turn on later judgments of the forseeability of an event, I am particu-
larly interested in how it effects our evaluation of our own behavior.
Uncertainty in prospect is seamlessly replaced by certainty in retro-
spect, making fair evaluation of our earlier choices very difficult.
Taken with the egocentric and motivational tendency for psychologi-
cally healthy people to validate whatever choice they have made,
hindsight bias makes evaluating client choices very difficult.
122 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 61, at § 5K1.1.
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Both Mr. Worth and Mr. Reade (the client who went to trial
rather than turn on his friend) knew at the end of their sentences that
they made the right choice. Yet both took risks, faced real conse-
quences and had no competing experiences against which to measure
their choices. Mr. Worth will never know how the trial would have
come out.123 Mr. Reade will never know how he would have felt if he
had cooperated and received the sentence of probation or six months
in jail that the judge who heard his case would likely have imposed.
Nor did Mr. Reade experience the violence or psychological damage
that many suffer in prison. What he does know is that he was a stand
up guy and made it through his prison experience.
At the end of Mr. Reade's sentence, it all seemed to have worked
out just as he had foreseen five years before. The same is true for Mr.
Worth. At the moment of his release, he was pleased. I can report
that in the moment, both men seemed to me to display hindsight bias
and both probably did, but now I think the most error laden judgment
was mine. For a long time I thought it obvious that Mr. Reade had
made a bad choice but used hindsight bias, and other psychological
defense mechanisms, to convince himself that he made the right
choice. I could not get past my own narrow framing of Mr. Reade's
problem to recognize that his devotion to a principle may well have
given him greater inner resolve to face his fate than I appreciated.
The choices Mr. Reade and Mr. Worth made cannot be directly com-
pared and I have come to appreciate that Mr. Reade's choice, like Mr.
Worth's choice, turned on a value choice applied to a reasonably accu-
rate understanding of the likely consequences. As I have come to un-
derstand Mr. Reade's choice in this light, I have also come to think
that he had a firmer basis that I thought for believing things worked
out as he knew they would.
Mr. Reade was more likely to be happy in the end because his
choice did not turn so much on the outcome. He stood for a principle
and did not expect a material reward for it, while Mr. Worth made a
deal and expected to benefit. Yet they both made choices in a world of
contingencies, in which happenstance probably played a larger role
than their evaluations, shaped in part by cognitive illusions. Before
the jury came back, Mr. Reade hoped to win the trial. Before the
judge imposed sentence I told Mr. Worth he could get a lengthy
123 Remaining ignorant of the trial outcome will motivate some people to settle to avoid
the regret a dispositive ruling might engender. Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The
Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43 (offering empirical
support for the argument that the emotional desire to avoid regret in the event the trial
outcome is not favorable is a significant and independent motivator of settlement for some
plaintiffs).
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sentence.
Our subjective evaluations of the choices we have made are
shaped by a range of factors, but in the end they are malleable and the
stories we tell about outcomes are shaped by cognitive bias and a
range of other psychological factors. Mr. Reade made a choice that
removed some of the uncertainty; whatever sentence he received, he
would have the psychic benefit of loyalty while Mr. Worth gambled all
on the magnitude of the benefit he would receive. Yet neither defen-
dant accounted for all the anxiety and uncertainty in their retrospec-
tive evaluation and in one case the lawyer could not see beyond his
own narrow framing of his client's problem for many years.
DON'T BELIEVE EVERYTHING You THINK
Like Cerberus guarding Hades, three closely related perils guard
the gates leading from cognitive confusion. We must avoid injury
from the ideas we never thought (representativeness bias), "the things
we know that ain't really so" (framing bias) and the paralysis that
comes from disbelieving all of our ideas. Finding the right degree of
skepticism and aiming it correctly is an art. While I could not give
instructions, I have tried to offer guideposts.
The first problem is identifying cognitive bias in ourselves and
our clients. These biases are subtle, unconscious and intuitively satis-
fying. They are often hard to spot. But when predictions have to be
made or outcomes compared, we should be alert to the possibility that
cognitive bias will rear its head. Differences of opinion about predic-
tions and the relative desirability of different outcomes can cause fric-
tion between a lawyer and his or her client. When that friction
develops, or when a difference in judgment threatens to cause friction,
the lawyer should consider whether the style, quality or substantive
content of the analysis is a problem.
Turning too quickly to cognitive bias to explain counseling
problems is also a danger. Lawyers can make up a story to fit most
facts, so we could often blame the client's faulty reasoning. We should
test for this possibility by offering more information and coaching the
client through his or her reasoning. If the problem is not resolved, we
should be slow to conclude that the client is beset by insuperable cog-
nitive biases. A client who persists in a surprising or troubling choice
may do so from commitment to different values or because of some
other situational or personal factor. The law, rules of professional re-
sponsibility and practice norms encourage us to accept the client's
choice.
When we have identified a potential cognitive bias problem, we
should also test ourselves, as well as our clients. As I have described,
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lawyers also face these problems. They are often harder to see in our-
selves than in others. Cognitive illusion carries with it the false assur-
ance of feeling correct. We all feel that for ourselves. It is,
unfortunately, often easier to have insights into others than into
ourselves.
If we think bias is at play, we still face that three headed dog.
How do we get past the representativeness problem to think about the
things we are not thinking about? It requires discipline to take the
time to consciously push the ideas that naturally flow into our immedi-
ate consciousness out of the way. Then we have to search our minds
for other ideas that may not be so readily accessible but nonetheless
may do some good. The problem solving books are full of exercises to
help us do this sort of thing, although many feel skeptical about a
recipe for creativity.
The second problem is recognizing "the things we know that re-
ally ain't so." We find this in framing bias, where it is clear to us that
the settlement is a win or a loss, even though we are wrong. When we
reason explicitly toward a prediction, we must monitor the facts upon
which we rely. Most of us could be more careful to act upon the best
and most reliable information we can get when we help others make
very important decisions.
The third problem is the threat of losing faith in our judgments
because they are not perfect. All of this talk of bias and illusion must
not obscure the tremendous power of human judgment. Our ability to
reflect upon and correct error is one of the great strengths of our rea-
soning. We should not believe everything we think, but we should
believe much of what we think, especially if we can develop the habit
of checking up on ourselves. Perhaps there is some comfort in know-
ing that our choice will usually seem all right in hindsight.
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